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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title
By Fairfax Leary, fr. and David Frisch*

On a number of issues arising under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.
or Code), the courts have reached conflicting results, yet the number of jurisdictions passing on each such issue remains small. There is still time, then, for
discussion of proper solutions of many of such Code issues. Of interest is the
continuing judicial struggle with the intermesh of the Code's warranty provisions, the strict liability provisions of the Restatement Second of Torts, section
402A, and the burgeoning new crop of products liability statutes. The trend
toward nuclear and computer problems is reflected in cases involving construction of nuclear plants, "heavy water" operations, and sales or leases of computers. The high interest rates of recent years have also resulted in litigation.
All of the foregoing is reflected in the decisions covered by this review.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
As conflicts in precedent develop, choice-of-law problems may arise with
greater frequency than in the past. Two cases ruling on the effect of choice-oflaw clauses have gone beyond the strict wording involved. In Hammel v. Ziegler
Financing Corp.,1 the court faced a usury problem when Wisconsin residents
were sued over a mobile home park in Missouri. The contract language was
that the obligations were "to be construed according to the law of Missouri."
*Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York and District of Columbia bars and teaches
law at The Delaware Law School of Widener University. Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode
Island bar and teaches law at the same university.
Don L. Baker of Austin, Texas, and Fairfax Leary, Jr. are cochairmen of the Subcommittee on
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title. Members of the subcommittee
are William K. Bachelder, Marvin E. Barkin, Marion Benfield, Jr., Paul Berkowitz, Bernard D.
Broeker, Calvin Corman, Lanny J. Davis, Richard W. Duesenberg, Robert W. Foster, David
Frisch, William D. Hawkland, Keith J. Hey, Daniel E. Johnson, Alvin G. Kalmanson, Dennis S.
Kayes, Ann Lousin, John D. Meader, Leo J. Pircher, Herbert Rubin, Gerald Solk, Alphonse M.
Squllante, Michael D. Strobehn, Ronald J. Thomas, Victor A. Vilaplana, and William R. Waddell.
Editor's note: This article is a continuation of the survey of 1983 developments under the
Uniform Commercial Code. Other sections of the survey appeared in the May 1984 issue of The
Business Lawyer.
I. 334 N.W.2d 913, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1496 (1983).
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The court properly ruled that the effect of this language was that the obligations
were "to be construed according to the law of Missouri." The negotiations of
the parties showed that their true intent was to have the clause govern only the
interpretation of language. In Northern States Power Co. v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 2 the court refused to apply a clause providing
that the contract was to be governed by New York law. The court felt that New
York bore no "reasonable relation" to the contract, noting that the choice-of-law
clause had not been the subject of negotiations between the parties. The
statement was appropriate since U.C.C. section 1-105, in its formulation of
choice of law rules, limits the application of a choice-of-law clause to the law of
states "having a reasonable relation to the transaction." 3
The inquiry into the intent of the parties was nevertheless appropriate. The
U.C.C. espouses freedom of contract as one of its cardinal principles. 4 Thus on
issues where the courts are divided as to the allocation of certain risks, a choiceof-law clause may effectuate an agreed contractual allocation of specific risks.
This was not the case in Northern States. The issue was whether a disclaimer of
consequential damages and a monetary limitation of liability survived when the
court held that an exclusive limited remedy "failed of its essential purpose." 5
Under Minnesota law the disclaimer also failed. In New York the disclaimer
survived. The selection of the state named in the choice-of-law clause could be
considered a contractual allocation of the risk. But it should be so considered
only if the choice-of-law clause had been negotiated for that purpose and the
selected allocation, if expressly stated in the contract, would not have been
repugnant to the law of the forum state. 6
The foregoing principle of freedom of contract is not always applied. Leasing
Service Corp. v. Diamond Timber lnc.,7 involved an equipment lease between a
New York corporation, as assignee, and a corporation located in the state of
Washington. The court considered only the "intensity of contract that exists
with Washington" and applied the law of Washington. The court felt that the
fact that the assignee was a New York corporation would not satisfy even the
2. 550 F. Supp. 108, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1124 (D. Minn. 1983).
3. Absent a selection-of-law clause, the requirement is an "appropriate relation," thus bringing
into the Code the "more significant contacts test" so dear to the hearts of devotees of the study of
conflicts of laws. See, e.g., Epprecht v. IBM Corp., _ _ F. Supp. _ _ , 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 391 n. l (E.D. Pa. 1983).
4. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978) provides for freedom of contract except in the limited area of
disclaimers of obligations of "good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act."
Even in these areas, the parties are free to write their own rules for judging these vague areas, if the
result is not judged to be "manifestly unreasonable."
5. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
6. The result may be different if the law of the state named in the choice-of-law clause is
repugnant to the laws of the forum state. Where the choice of Michigan law was made by the
parties, who expressly included a clause shortening the time for bringing actions in their contract,
the court in Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) refused to enforce the contractual shortening of the
period in view of a non-Code statute (Fla. Stat.§ 95.03 (1975) prohibiting such provisions.
7. 559 F. Supp. 972, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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reasonable relation test. 8 There was no discussion of the parties' intent in
including such a clause.
Counsel drafting a choice-of-law clause should be careful to express what is
intended thereby. Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc. 9 involved a warranty
claim regarding expansion joints sold for use in the construction of a "heavy
water facility." The choice-of-law provision read, "A contract arising out of the
acceptance of a tender shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of
Ontario." 10 Judge Latchum, in the district court of Delaware, ruled that this
clause did not con~titute a contractual agreement that the Ontario statute of
limitations would apply even though the breach of warranty occurred upon a
tender in Ontario. Further, the Delaware "borrowing statute" applied, and it
stipulated that the proper statute of limitations was the shorter of either the
Delaware statute or the statute of the state or country where the cause of action
arose. Ontario's argument that a repair or replacement provision as an exclusive
remedy was in effect a warranty extending to future performance did not
prevail.
The doctrine of privity of contract is not dead in all states. It is alive and well
in Georgia, raising its head in a diversity action in the relatively new eleventh
circuit. 11 A Massachusetts company manufactured the fabric used by a Georgia
company in producing tarpaulins sold to a trucking company with headquarters
in Florida. The tarpaulins were supposedly made of waterproof fabric. They
leaked, causing water damage to the goods being transported interstate by the
trucker. The trucker, having paid claims for cargo damage and for repairs to the
tarpaulins, refused to pay for a shipment of new tarps claiming they were
substitutes for the defective ones.
Sued for the price by the seller, the fabric maker, Norton, (a party to the
trucker's counterclaim) moved for dismissal on the ground that Georgia law
governed the claim against it and under Georgia law direct privity was essential. '
The trucker argued that Florida law applied dispensing with privity. Unfortunately, the trucker had made an averment, to support ancillary jurisdiction, that
his claim against the Massachusetts manufacturer was "brought in the jurisdiction [Georgia] where the cause of action arose." This was enough to secure a
dismissal on the contract claims. The Georgia conflicts law of torts (The
trucking company asserted a claim for strict liability in tort.) follows the "lex
loci delicti" rule. However, no one knew in what state the injuries occurred.

8. The choice-of-law clause was unusual in that it provided that the applicable law was "'the
law of the state ... of Lessee or Lessor [said assignee hereinafter called Lessor] or the original
lessor,' " leaving the choice up in the air. Id. at 975, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1078. Hence, the
court's discussion of the effect of the choice of law clause is only dicta.
9. _ _ F. Supp.--· 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1222 (D. Del. 1983).
10. Id. at 1226.
11. Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1175 (I Ith Cir. 1983).
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Due to its inability to pick the place of injury, the court applied the law of
Georgia where the tarps were fabricated.12

HYBRID SALES AND SERVICES CASES
Whether article 2 should be applied to hybrid contracts involving a transfer of
title to goods and the rendition of services continues to plague the courts in a
variety of cases. One recent case involved the construction of a nuclear plant; 13
another the implanting of an inflatable mammary prosthesis. 14 Apparently
neither worked as intended. The nuclear plant case involved the applicable
statute of limitations; the issue in the other case was the existence and scope of
liability for implied warranties.
In the prosthesis case, the doctor was held to be rendering a service primarily,
so no warranty was involved. In the nuclear plant case, the court reviewed
earlier New York cases under the verbal formula that courts, in determining the
classification, "look to the main objective sought to be accomplished by the
contracting parties." The court rejected the approach of applying sale~ !aw to
the sales aspect of a transaction which combines both sales and service. The
court ruled that whether the effect of disclaimers and limitations of liability
should be considered under the U.C.C. or under the common law of service
contracts should be deferred pending a development of the full record. Thus the
burden of discovery will be necessary, and a trial if, after discovery, the court
refuses to be satisfied with summary judgment affidavits to decide the factual
issue of "the main objective of the parties."
Two contracts for the installation of glass panels both concluded that the
contracts were for the sale of goods. One was for "curtain wall glass and
glazing," which defendant had refused to replace. 15 The four-year statute was
applied to bar the action. In the second glass case,1 6 the contract was "to furnish
and install aluminum and glass curtain wall and store front work." The
installation contractor had purchased the glass from defendant, Shatterproof
Glass Co. After the first installation, the glass became discolored and the
defendant replaced the defective glass and paid for the cost of installation. Nine
months thereafter the glass was again discolored, but the defendant declined to
replace it a second time. Suit was brought more than four years after the first
installation but less than four years after the second. On a federal rule 12(b )( 6)
12. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc. might have argued that its claim against the manufacturer was
essentially one for indemnity for amounts paid to customers and hence arose in Florida, where it
paid damages. Here, too, it probably would be held to its averment, which was quickly admitted in
the fabric maker's answer.
13. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1496 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1472 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1983 ).
15. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 477 (8th Cir. 1983).
16. Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 87 (4th Cir. 1983).
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motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court
ruled that enough was stated in the complaint so that, in view of the favorable
position of plaintiffs in such motions, it could not be ruled that the contract with
the installer was not a contract for the sale of goods. The court then assumed
that the second installation had the same warranties as the first. The result was
that the action brought almost seven years after the sales contract was made
was, nevertheless, timely because it was within four years of the second
installation. The court mentioned that in a long-term contract with installment
deliveries a new period of limitations began with each delivery.
The court stated that the issue for trial was whether, if the contract with the
installer, as distinguished from the installer's contract with the defendant, was
for services and so free of warranties, the plaintiff could directly sue the
defendant. The issue arose because Maryland, where all this occurred, had
adopted a nonuniform amendment to its Uniform Commercial Code section
2-314(1 )(b ), providing that the term "seller" in sections 2-314 through 2-318 of
its U.C.C. included "the manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler, or other
middleman or the retailer," and also providing that "any previous requirement
of privity is abolished as between the buyer and the seller in any action brought
by the buyer." 17 But no change was made in the definition of "buyer" in U.C.C.
section 2-102( 1 )(a) as "a person who buys goods." Hence, an issue would exist,
if properly raised, that since plaintiff's only contract was with the installer, that
contract would also have to be a contract for the sale of goods so that plaintiff
would be a buyer within Maryland's statutory abolition of the doctrine of
privity. 18
One other case involved a patient who died during open-heart surgery due to
an alleged defective heart-lung-oxygenator which, the complaint alleged,
pumped air into the patient's aorta instead of blood. 19 The case adopted the
service contract analogy with respect to the patient-hospital and patient-doctor
contracts.
In Semler v. Knowling,2° the Iowa Supreme Court, while classifying a
contract by a landlord with defendant contractor to install a sewer line as a
service contract, did provide a common law warranty recovery for the landlord
for damages suffered due to repeated back-ups in the sewer line, dumping raw
sewage in the basement of the apartment. The court found no reason to exclude
this landlord from the warranty protection given a lessee of a dwelling or a
buyer of goods.
.
The so-called "predominant purpose test" does not seem to have either
reduced litigation or made advising clients any easier. Neither has the continu17. Hence it may not be true, as the editor's note states, that the court could have reached the
same result by applying Maryland's nonuniform amendment. At least the court did not seem to
think so.
18. See supra note 17.
19. Redwine v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 883 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1982).
20. 325 N.W.2d 395, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1542 (Iowa 1982).
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ous flow of cases involving the application of some or all of the sections of article
2 of the U.C.C. to equipment leasing transactions. 21

ARTICLE 2-SALES
An overview of the cases decided under article 2 does not indicate any
startling new departures, but rather continued uneasiness in working out an
eventual rule leading to identical results in products liability cases whether the
action is in contract or tort. The cases also show that courts too often treat the
interpretations of particular sections of the U.C.C. after the manner of a single
ad hoc statute rather than an integrated Code.

FORM, FORMATION, AND READJUSTMENT OF
CONTRACT
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
One of the more misapplied sections of U.C.C. section 2-201 is its "between
merchants" provision. Under subsection (2), the statute of frauds was satisfied
when a merchant failed to object to a timely "confirmation" of an oral contract
within ten days after receipt with reason to know the contents. In Thompson
Printing Machinery Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 22 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered when, in a large organization, a
mailing addressed just to the corporation was to be considered "received" with
"reason to know its contents."
In the case, Thompson Printing Machinery Co. claimed an oral contract for
the purchase from B. F. Goodrich Co. of three items of printing machinery
showing that a memorandum to which no objection had been made, had been
sent four days after the telephone conversation. Goodrich defended on the
ground of no oral contract and no receipt of the memorandum by anyone whose
reason to know the contents was effective against Goodrich. Its defense was that
Thompson had not sufficiently addressed the envelope for the contents to comply
with the statutory requirements, as it was just addressed to the corporation in
Akron, Ohio.
After a jury verdict for Thompson on both the existence of the oral contract
and the receipt of the written confirmation, the district judge ruled, as a matter
of law, that Goodrich had a statute of frauds defense. On August 18, 1983, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded on the ground that the terms of the
statute were satisfied on either of two grounds. The first ground was that receipt
by the mail room was receipt by Goodrich as there was no specific requirement
in the Code that the memorandum be received by any Goodrich agent in
particular. The reason to know the contents was said to be satisfied because the
purchase order was not a "spurious document." The second ground was that
21. See Mooney, Recent Cases Relating to Equipment Leasing, Equipment Leasing (P.L.I.
1983).
22. 714 F.2d 744, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 737 (7th Cir. 1983).
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"[e]ven if we go beyond the literal requirements of§ 2-201(2) and read into the
'receipt' requirement the 'receipt of notice' rule of section 1-201 (27), we still
think Thompson" satisfied the requirements of U.C.C. section 2-201(2). 23 The
reasoning given was that the procedures followed by the mail room could not be
said to have constituted due diligence as a matter of law. The court said, "First
the purchase order on its face should have alerted the mail room that the
documents referred to a purchase of used printing equipment." 24 Hence, since
Goodrich had only one surplus equipment department, the document and the
check should have been sent there, 25 or the mail room should have telephoned
Thompson to ask who should receive the memorandum and the enclosed check.
Corporate counsel may find their client's mail room procedures worth examining in the light of the case. The court did not have to decide whether, in view
of U.C.C. section 1-207(27), the ten days of U.C.C. section 2-201 (2) should run
from the time of receipt by the mail room or from, perhaps, the one-week-laterplus telephone call when there should have been receipt by the relevant
department. The latter date seems preferable in view of the reason-to-know-itscontents language in the statute. The defense of the statute of frauds should not
be lost until the memorandum reaches an individual having the authority and
the duty to send objections, namely, the "individual conducting the transaction"
under U.C.C. section 1-207(27).
The Sixth Circuit in Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. 26 had to deal
with a conflict in the terms required to be in the memorandum under U.C.C.
section 2-201 (1) and Ohio's "not to be performed within one year" general
statute of frauds provision. Under the latter statute, Ohio case law required that
the writing include all the terms of the agreement. 27 While admitting in a
footnote that the Eighth Circuit had reached an opposite conclusion 28 on the
similar statutes of another state, the Sixth Circuit found an irreconciliable
conflict between the two Ohio provisions, both as to what should be in the
memorandum and in the "admission in court" exceptions of U.C.C. section
2-201(3)(b). The court flatly stated that the statutory section in which the oneyear provision is found was a general provision applicable to all contracts and
the U.C.C. statute of frauds section was a special provision, being a "special
legislative attempt to tailor the statute of frauds to the unique characteristics of a

23. 714 F.2d at 748, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 742.
24. 714 F.2d at 748, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 742-43.
25. Unless one takes the position that "everyone" knows that Goodrich makes no printing
equipment and hence any "Purchase Order" for printing equipment must be for surplus equipment
even though not described as used.
26. 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1435 (6th Cir. 1983).
27. Id. at 141 n.12, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1144-45 n.12. The court cited Quarto Mining Co.
v. Litman, 326 N.E. 2d 676 (1975) and O'Leary v. Burnett, 92 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ohio Ct. App.
1949).
28. 705 F.2d at 141 n.11, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1444 n. 11 (citing Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co.
v. Continental Oil, 534 F.2d 1281, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 61 (8th Cir. 1976) ).
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commercial sales transaction." 29 Once having made the general-special classification without any great discussion or reasoning, it followed that the special, the
U.C.C., must be construed as an exception to the general, and so would prevail.
It would seem that one could argue that contracts for the sale of goods, where
performance of a contract could not occur within a year, were exceptions to the
general run of contracts for the sale of goods and could require greater
formality. The Code drafters were not unaware of the very prevalent one-year
provisions. Had it been intended to supplant the one-year rule, provision could
easily have been made to have the memorandum under U.C.C. section 2-201(1)
made sufficient for both statutes. The result might well have been that the
"between merchants" "admission in court" exceptions in U.C.C. sections
2-201(2) and (3) would also have been made applicable to the performancewithin-one-year statute. ·whether they should apply to long-term contracts is an
issue the resolution of which may well depend upon the resolver's general
feeling about the efficacy of statutes of frauds today.
A clear misreading of the provisions and intent of U.C.C. sections 2-201 and
2-202 occurred, but not for the first time, 30 in David]. Joseph Co. v. S &- M
Scrap Metal Co. 31 After prior oral discussions, S & M sent a purchase
confirmation form to Joseph Co. covering "'60 carloads (estimated 2700 gross
tons)' of '#2 bundles of scrap iron for remelting and recycling.'" After shipping
about 1305 tons in "33 or 34 carloads," Joseph ceased shipping and sued for
payment contending that the quantity term in the confirmation incorrectly
stated the quantity term orally discussed. The jury agreed, and the trial court
rendered judgment for Joseph and also against S & M on its counterclaim for
damages for failure to ship the balance of the 2700 gross tons.
The purchase confirmation also contained price and delivery terms and a
reference to terms on the reverse, one of which was quoted by the court as
providing:
This confirmation constitutes the entire contract between the parties.
Receipt of this confirmation by seller shall be deemed to be an acceptance
by seller of the terms and conditions of this contract regardless of whether

29. 705 F.2d at 141, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1445. For an approach requiring compliance with
both goods and the "one year," see Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 110 comment band§ 130,
comment f ( 1981 ).
30. Cf, e.g., Shpilberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 227, 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (Ky. 1976); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 35
A.D.2d 194, 315 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1970), for some roots of this bad law. See Duesenberg, Annual
Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title, 30 Bus. Law 847, 853
(1975), where the Survey discusses the interplay of U.C.C. § 2-207 and§ 2-201 is used to make a
confirmation binding. See also Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc. 407 F.
Supp 581, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 79 (N.D. Ga. 1975), ajj'd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1978); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Jaiswal, 463 N.Y.S.2d 78, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
31. 163 Ga. App. 685, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 44 (1982).
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or not the seller has acknowledged this confirmation. Any additional or
inconsistent terms or conditions are not binding on [appellant] ... 32
Joseph Co. admitted receipt and that no objection was made.
Combining U.C.C. sections 2-201(2) and 2-202, the court ruled that the
purchase confirmation became, through the failure to object, a final integrated
agreement. Joseph Co.'s contention that the purchase confirmation was not
intended to be the final expression of the parties (that is, both) was denied
because it "directly contradicts the document's express terms which were not
objected to within ten days of receipt." 33
Ignored totally was the second sentence of comment 3 to U.C.C. section
2-201, which states of subsection (2) "[t]he only effect, however, is to take away
from the party who fails to answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds; the
burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally
prior to the written confirmation is unaffected." This is not legislation by
comment; it is a statement of the underlying purpose of any statute of frauds.
Compliance with the statute merely opens the mouths of the parties. Courts
following the Joseph Co. approach give the last-shot confirmer tremendous
leverage contrary to the purpose of the statute, which was merely to allow oral
testimony from both.

CONTRACT INFORMATION
Offer and Acceptance
One of the basic questions in any contract dispute is whether there have been
an offer and an acceptance. The U.C.C. addresses these issues in U.C.C.
sections 2-204 through 2-207. Courts look at the context in which an offer and
acceptance allegedly took place. If there is a strong course of dealing, as
exemplified by exchanges of letters on prior occasions, the court will be likely to
sustain the trial court's finding as to whether there was an "agreement". 34
Under U.C.C. section 2-205, a party may make an irrevocable offer without
requiring additional consideration if certain factual conditions are present. In
City University of New York v. Fina/co, lnc., 35 a New York court doubted
whether the offeror, who apparently continued negotiations after the "offer,"
had really made an offer, and whether the parties intended to be bound by the
agreement. Therefore it denied a motion for summary judgment. In Day v.
32. Id. at 685, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 45.
33. Id. at 687, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47.
34. See Bethleham Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 468 A.2d 748, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1059 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1983) where a panel of seven superior court judges reversed on
rehearing the previous holding of a three-judge panel (Id. at 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1091 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1982)) which held there was no contract despite the holding of the trial judge to the contrary.
Of the seven-judge panel, three judges dissented, substantially following the previous panel's
opinion.
35. 461 N.Y.S.2d 830, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (all cone.,
except Sandler, J.P. and Alexander, J., diss. w/op.).
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Amax, Inc., 36 the only semblance of an offer was an escrow agreement signed by
the offeree and containing some of the terms for a possible sale. The court held
that this did not constitute an offer either.
If an offer does not generate an acceptance, it is basic that there can be no
contract. Under U.C.C. section 2-206, a seller may accept an offer embodied in
a purchase order simply by shipping the goods. The Code does not specify other
actions that might constitute acceptance. In Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 37 the seller's registry of the buyer's purchase orders as "received" did not manifest either an acceptance or a promise to ship that could
constitute an acceptance. Therefore, there was no contract. But would a registry
that read "received-need to ship by next Monday" or "received-ship by next
Monday" have qualified as sufficient action to constitute acceptance?
Another issue of acceptance arose in D. R. Curtis Co. v. Mason, 36 in which
the seller said he "might be interested in contracting to sell his spring wheat
crop" to the buyer. The court held that this was not an acceptance, just an
"exploration of the possibilities of a sale."

Indefiniteness and Open Terms
Under U.C.C. section 2-204, the parties need not meticulously fill in every
single term of an agreement in order to form a valid contract. How many terms,
however, may the parties leave open before the court will decide that they did
not intend to make a contract?
Several recent cases attempted to answer that question. In Roy Buckner
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Cagle, 39 the buyer's order form was only partially complete,
was not signed in the right place by the seller's agent, and the price was given
only as "list price." Nonetheless, the court deemed this order form sufficiently
filled-in to constitute both a valid contract under U.C.C. section 2-204(3) and
an enforceable contract under U.C.C. section 2-201, the statute of frauds, which
requires a writing "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made."
The price term was an issue in two other cases. In Vermont Morgan Corp. v.
Ringer Enterprises, Inc.,4° the parties wrote that the price term was to "be
determined by reference to prevailing prices in the state." This raised so many
questions of fact that the court denied summary judgment and ordered the trial
court to consider both the parties' course of dealings and reasonableness of the
price charged in establishing the price term. In D. R. Curtis Co. v. Mathews, 41
the parties, following their course of dealing, left a significant component of the
price term open, hoping that they could agree on it later. When they failed to
agree, the court filled in the term with the solution of U.C.C. section 2-305, a
"reasonable price at the time for delivery."
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

701F.2d1258, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1416 (8th Cir. 1983).
703 F.2d 534, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1087 (9th Cir. 1983).
649 P.2d 1232, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1109 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
418 So. 2d 878, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 413 (Ala. 1982).
461N.Y.S.2d446, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
653 P.2d 1188, 35 U.C:C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1425 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
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There were only two cases concerning requirements contracts. In Cavalier
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Liberty Homes, lnc., 42 the court held that, since there
was no indication that the quantity to be delivered was to be measured by
requirements, there was no true requirements contract. There was a true
requirements contract, however, in Stacks v. F. & S. Petroleum Co. 43 There was
also no duration term. The court held that the sentence, "We agree to furnish
you fuel in an amount up to 50,000 gallons per month" indicated that the
"requirements would approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure, in this
instance, 50,000 gallons per month," although the buyer presumably could
require fewer gallons if he did not need that many. The duration of the contract
was "a reasonable time," as U.C.C. section 2-309 indicates.

Waivers and Modifications
U.C.C. section 2-209 is the basic provision dealing with modifications and
waivers. U.C.C. section 2-209(1) makes good faith the touchstone for modification. Because good faith and commercial reasonableness are obligations that
pervade article 2 as to merchants, a modification must meet both standards. 44
If the parties agree in writing that they will modify their agreement only by a
written modification, they ought not be able to modify orally. However, the
waiver provision in U.C.C. section 2-209( 4) is so broad that it virtually nullifies
such a clause in the written contract. Moreover, the parties' post-contracting
conduct can indicate their mutual intent to modify, as was held in Linear Corp.
v. Standard Hardware Co. 45
Perhaps the most common waiver is a seller's waiver of the right to receive
timely payments. In Westmont Tractor Co. v. Viking Exploration, lnc., 46 a
lessor waived the requirement that he receive an advance payment from the
lessee before he delivered the goods to the lessee. A seller is, however, sometimes
justified in retracting a waiver. For example, in Hart v. Sims,4 1 the seller waived
her right to receive payments on time by accepting the buyer's untimely
personal check. She was justified in retracting that waiver when she learned the
check was drawn against insufficient funds.
While there is perhaps no duty to agree to or negotiate in good faith for a
modification, a court could avoid a modification extracted in bad faith and by an
overuse of bargaining power in a time of product shortage by allowing a buyer
to recover the extra price paid as a cost of "cover," using the amended contract
as cover for the original contract. This could be a neat way of avoiding the area
of economic duress, and this may well be what was back of the 1979 decision in
42. 454 A.2d 367, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
43. 641 S.W.2d 726, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 376 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982).
44. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., (Callaghan) 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1435 (6th Cir. 1983).
45. 423 So. 2d 966, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
46. 543 F. Supp. 1314, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 423 (D. Mont. 1982).
47. 702 F.2d 574, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1517 (5th Cir. 1983).
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B. B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chemical Co. 48 on obtaining cover from the
original seller.

THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
While there were no startingly new developments in the area of the "battle of
the forms," the current cases do show that current high interest rates, a problem
also discussed hereinafter under "Remedies," 49 have also surfaced where different provisions about delayed payments are used. How should a term for interest
on delayed payments be treated? In Eskay Plastics Ltd. v. Chappell, 50 the
Washington Court of Appeals ruled that a term for interest on delayed payments became a part of the contract between merchants absent a showing by the
buyer contesting the term that its offer expressly limited the acceptance to the
terms of the offer, or that the term factually amounted to a material alteration.
Incidentally, the buyer lost on claims that the term was "inconspicuous" (no
objection to it having been sent) and that failure to make the interest charge on
previous invoices amounted to a waiver of the term.
On the other hand, a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court in Rangen, Inc. v.
Valley Trout Farms, Inc. 51 seemed to prefer the illustrative statement in the
comment 52 that "a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices" was a
clause "offering no element of surprise" and was therefore "to be incorporated
into the contract unless notice of objection is seasonably given" to the trial
judge's laconic statement that a clause which raised the amount of interest
payable from the $1,400 recoverable by law to $27,000 was" 'a substantial
alteration in anyone's view.' " 53 Judge Brestline dissented on the ground that
the trial judge's ruling on material alteration should have been upheld, noting
that certain cases cited by the majority 54 upheld trial court findings instead of
reversing them. He also protested the majority's analogy of the interest provision to a provision for liquidated damages based on a reference at the end of the
above quoted comment to U.C.C. section 2-718. The reference was at the end of
48. 474 F. Supp. 651, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 561 (M.D. N.C. 1979).
49. See infra, text accompanying notes 176-83.
50. 660 P.2d 764, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
51. As revised on rehearing, 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1129, and 35
U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. (Callaghan) 52 (Idaho 1982).
52. U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 5 ( 1978), gives illustrations of clauses said not to be material
alterations. The text of the comment reads: a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or
fixing seller's standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade practice and do not
limit any credit bargained for ... " (emphasis added). Grammatically, the antecedent of "they"
could be construed as referring only to "credit terms." But Brestline, Jr., in Rangen Inc., indicated
that in context it might refer to "interest" as well.
53. 658 P.2d at 960, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1137 (Brestline, J., dissenting).
54. Tim Hennigan Co. v. Anthony A. Numes, Inc., 437 A.2d 1355, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 730 (R.I. 1981); F.D. McKendall Lumber Co. v. Kalian, 425 A.2d 515, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1237 (R.I. 1981); Interlake, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 398 N.E.2d
945, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 689 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979). The majority's list also included
Loizeaux Builders Supply Co. v. Donald B. Ludwig Co., 366 A.2d 721, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 58 (N.j. Super. Ct. 1976), which was not referred to by]. Brestline.
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a term in the comment relating to clauses limiting the right of rejection in
accordance with trade practices or "otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable
manner."
On rehearing, the court added material to the effect that the buyer had
waived its objection to the interest term by continuing to order fish food after
seller had insisted the interest term was a part of the contract. As to this, Judge
Brestline also dissented.
The real problem may well be the way statutory fixed rates for prejudgment
interest get out of line with a rapidly fluctuating market rate of interest. The
resulting dollar difference in Idaho was startling. The statute provided for a
prejudgment interest of eight percent a year on open account terms after the
ninetieth day of nonpayment. It is also worthy of note that the quoted comment
5 appeared in the May 1949 draft. 55 In the interest rate market of that day, 56
and in the drafting period thereafter, the market rates were low 57 and it made
sense to refer to provisions for interest as nonmaterial changes.
In addition, while the 1956 recommendations made no changes, they did
change the comment 6 to U.C.C. section 2-207 by adding
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party
must be assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on
the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the requirement that there be
notice of objection which is found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the
conflicting terms do not become part of the contract. The contract then
consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the
confirmation agree, and terms supplied by this Act including subsection
(2).
This last comment overlooks the effect of "silent terms," that is, statutory
provisions that, by operation of law, become part of a contract unless otherwise
agreed. Are they not part of an offer which does not spell them out? And does
the comment intend to limit "silent terms" to those found in the Code to the
exclusion of other statutes such as prejudgment interest statutes? It would seem
that the Code, under U.C.C. section 1-103, 58 should not do this. The result,
however, would be that all attempts in the second salvo of the battle of the forms
to modify silent contract terms are doomed to be relegated to mere "proposals
for addition to the contract." Presumably, then, the modifying terms would
require an express consent for inclusion in the contract, or the terms expressed
in the opening salvo will govern.
A problem is also found in cases where a seller accepts by shipping and
sending an invoice with additional terms. In Surplus Electronics Corp. v.
55. Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-207, comment 5 (May 1949 Draft).
56. See Fed. Res. Bull. Statistics for 1949-1952-interest rates.
57. Many municipal bonds were sold at rates of 1.5% and 1.75% on long-term bonds at that
time.
58. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (directing the application of the principles of law and equity
"[u]nless displaced by a particular provision of this Act").
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Gallin, 59 the Colorado Court of Appeals was faced with a seller's term, in the
second salvo, for interest on past-due accounts and obliging buyer to pay seller's
attorney's fees. Seller testified the term was not discussed. The buyer testified
that there was a conversation with the seller in which it was agreed that neither
was a part of the contract. The term was in small print. The court concluded
that on either version of the discussions there was not sufficient evidence to
establish an agreement "or that the small print on the invoice ... was a part of
the contract." 60
Sometimes the discrepancies in the wording of the forms may not affect the
dispute before the court. Then, in the interest of preserving the transaction
between the parties, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Central Bag Co. v. W.
Scott & Co. 61 ruled that the terms in seller's invoice confirmation differing from
those in buyer's order confirmation form did not permit buyer to refuse to
perform on the ground that there was no contract. The case seems correct in
that the policy of article 2 as a whole is to prevent discrepancies in the paper
work from spoiling a contract where the discrepancies are relied on in an effort
to get out of a transaction. In this sense, the "materially alter" clause of U.C.C.
section 2-207(2)(b) could be read as meaning "change the outcome of the suit
before the court."
The usual case, however, involves clauses that do materially alter the outcome
or the locus of litigation. This year two cases illustrate the struggle over
conflicting warranty terms that had. a substantial effect on liability. One was
Wheaton Glass Co. v. Pharmex, Inc. 62 Here the buyer's purchase order was
silent on the matter of consequential damages. Shortly after its receipt, seller,
apparently on the same day, shipped the goods. At common law this would have
been an acceptance on the buyer's terms, but the seller also on the same day sent
a document captioned "Order Billing" containing a clause, all in capital letters,
stating in some detail that the seller should not be liable "for special or
consequential damages." Admitting that such a clause could be regarded as a
material alteration, the court said that the issue, assuming the Order Billing
form constituted the acceptance, could not be decided on a motion for summary
judgment as the issue was one of fact. An apparently opposirig position was
taken in Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburgh Manufacturing Corp., 63 before the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which stated that issues raised by an exchange
of business forms were issues of law and should not be submitted to a jury.
There was, however, no reversal of the judgment below as the court felt that the
jury's interpretation of the disclaimer of warranties should stand.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

653 P.2d 752, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 754, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 428.
647 S.W.2d 828, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
548 F. Supp. 1242, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 65 (D.N.J. 1982).
654 F.2d 1197, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 368 (6th Cir. 1981 ).

U.C.C. Survey: Sales

1865

On the other hand, in one case64 there was language in a purchase order
limiting the contract to its terms. The language specifically prohibited changes
unless made in writing by the purchaser and stated that "[b] uyer's inspectors
and expeditors are not authorized to order changes affecting the ... purchase
order .... " District Judge Hannum faced what was in essence a claim for
modification. The seller's acknowledgement forms limited its liability to replacing defective goods or allowing credit for them, and specifically stated that " 'no
claims for labor or consequential damages [would] be allowed'." 65 The seller's
form stated that its terms became a part of the contract when signed by buyer.
Employees of buyer had signed the acknowledgement form to acknowledge
receipt of the goods.
Noting that similar clauses had been held materially to alter the contract,
Judge Hannum also interpreted the buyer's clause as limiting acceptance to its
terms unless altered by an agreement enforceable by justifiable reliance by the
seller. He concluded that an issue of fact was raised concerning the authority of
the signing employees to bind the buyer. Therefore he felt summary judgment
was precluded.
Northern States Power Co. v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. 66
illustrates how problems can be created in form contracting. Northern States
Power sent out a "Request for Quotation." Defendant Meyer, a division of
ITT, responded with a proposal which read, "Delete your paragraph 6 and
replace with our paragraph 16 'Warranty and Limitation of Liability Clause'."
During the following negotiations nothing was said about the limitation of
liability clause. Meyer was given an oral order to proceed. Then Northern
States issued its purchase order "Confirming verbal order of 8-11-78 Per Your
Proposal #780049 of 7-16-78,'' but stating nothing about a limitation of
liability clause. In response, Meyer issued its "Sales Acknowledgement Form"
with a statement of its "Basis of Acceptance" incorporating "Meyer Terms and
Conditions of Sale as stated in Proposal 780049 dated July 16, 1978." Also on
the back of the form were "Terms and Conditions of Sale" containing the
identical paragraph 16 as in the proposal.
Since th~ purchase order offer referred to the proposal and did not change it,
the court felt that both offer and acceptance contained the same terms limiting
Meyer's liability "solely to job site replacement or repair, at the sole option of
Meyer, of any defective part or parts during a period of one ( 1) year from date
of shipment, providing the product is properly installed and is being used as
originally intended." This was followed by a paragraph, all in capital letters,
making the clause the buyer's exclusive remedy and providing that "under no
circumstances shall Meyer be liable for any costs loss, expense, damages, special
damages, incidental damages, or consequential damages arising directly or
64. Reliance Steel Prod. Co. v. Kentucky Elec. Steel Co., _ _ F. Supp. - - , 35 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1430 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
65. Id. at I 432 nn. 3 & 4.
66. 550 F. Supp. 108, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1124 (D. Minn. I 982).
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indirectly from the use of the products, whether based upon warranty, contract
negligence or strict liability." Not much left to sue about!
Clearly this was a "parts only" warranty. The products were screw anchors
designed to hold guy wires supporting towers holding high-tension transmission
wires. One thousand of these were installed in the ground during February and
March 1979. About five months later aluminum towers were flown into place
and the guy wires were tightened. A month or so thereafter four towers fell to
the ground because the screw anchors came apart at a welded joint. The
Northern States determined that all should be replaced. The total cost was
$2,404,016.
Since the court ruled that both parties' forms contained that clause due to the
"per your proposal" reference in the Northern States purchase order, plaintiff
argued unconscionability and that the limited remedy had failed in its essential
purpose. Unconscionability received short shrift, the court stating there was no
basis for it as no personal injury was involved and there was no inequality of
bargaining power. But under applicable Minnesota law, 67 where the clause
failed in its essential purpose, plaintiff would be entitled to recover consequential and other damages. This raised issues of fact about whether there had been
such a failure, so summary judgment was denied.
A case where overdrafting backfired is Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 68 Buyer's form
contained a provision for full warranties and also contained the following:
Acceptance of this Purchase Order must be made on its exact terms and if
additional or different terms are proposed by Seller such response will
constitute a counter-offer, and no contract shall come into existence without Buyer's written assent to the counter-offer. Buyer's acceptance of or
payment for material shipped shall constitute acceptance of such material
subject to the provisions herein, only, and shall not constitute acceptance of
any counter-offer by Seller not assented to in writing.
The "acknowledgement" by Westinghouse stated "'YOUR ORDER HAS
BEEN ENTERED AS OUR GENERAL ORDER (GO) NUMBER AS
SHOWN ABOVE. Our Regional Order Correspondent will be better able to
serve you if our GO number is referred to in all communications .... SEE
REVERSE SIDE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS.' " On the reverse the
opening paragraph read " 'The conditions stated below shall take precedence
over any conditions which may appear on your standard form, and no provisions or condition of such form except as expressly stated herein, shall be
binding on Westinghouse.' " 69
Plaintiff purchased a gas turbine unit and a control device which malfunctioned, allegedly causing an explosion and $1,900,000 in damage. The Westing67. Considerations making the Minnesota law applicable are discussed, supra, in the text
following note 2.
68. _ _ P.2d _ _ , 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
69. Id. at 77-78.
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house form limited recovery on express warranties to claims made within one
year of the sale, with the same limitation on claims for breach of implied
warranties, and a limitation of tort liability to the $15,000 cost of the product.
Plaintiff argued that under U.C.C. section 2-207(3 ), since the writings
disagreed, the contract consisted of the terms on which the writings agreed and
the warranties of the Code filled the warranty gap.
The court used the common law approach. Plaintiff had characterized any
response with different terms as a counteroffer. Further, the Westinghouse form
had no explicit "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" because, said
the court, the "Purchase Order would not permit it to be one." Since a
counteroffer revokes the offer, the issue was whether plaintiff had accepted the
Westinghouse offer. Acceptance was found through plaintiff's receipt, payment
for, and use of the product. One can wonder what rules the court would have
applied had the plaintiff's form not referred to a form with additional or
different terms as a counteroffer? Would it have found another way to continue
to apply common law rules despite the Code?
In other rulings the court held that strict liability in tort did not apply to two
large commercia"l enterprises which were dealing from positions of relatively
equal bargaining strength, and that there was no unconscionability about the
terms specified. It affirmed summary judgment for Westinghouse on the strict
liability and warranty claims, as well as partial summary judgment in tort,
limiting the Westinghouse liability to the cost of the defective product.
Finally, in Slocomb Industries, Inc. v. Chelsea lndustries, 70 District Judge
Newcomer was faced with a claim that U.C.C. section 2-207(3) should be
applied when, after a contract had expired by its terms, the parties continued to
deal. Defendant seller had prepared and sent to buyer a form of contract. Buyer
never signed it. The suit was for breach of warranty and for refusal to continue
to supply. Buyer attempted to make a case under U.C.C. section 2-207(3),
claiming that the conduct of the parties made a contract on the terms of the
writing sent by defendant.
Judge Newcomer ruled that U.C.C. section 2-207(3) was not the appropriate
section unless there were conflicting writings. Rather, the Code required resort
to U.C.C. section 2-204, and this precluded summary judgment as the factual
issue was whether there was mutual assent and the facts in the affidavits before
the court on summary judgment were in conflict as to mutual assent. However,
the learned judge ruled that the facts did show a sufficient basis for believing
that a contract existed to dismiss the defense of the statute of frauds under
U.C.C. section 2-201. He correctly pointed out that such a ruling did not
preclude either a later finding that no contract had been formed or a finding as
to the terms on which one had been formed, that is, whether there was any
obligation to continue to supply. 71
70. _ _ F. Supp. _ _ , 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
71. Also asserted was a Clayton Act violation on which the judge did grant defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
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From the foregoing and from the cases discussed in previous annual surveys, 72
it can be seen that U.C.C. section 2-207 does not settle problems arising in the
battle of the forms too aptly, and above all, the denials of summary judgment
show that, in cases of dispute over what terms are in the contract, there is no
method of avoiding the cost, expense, and time involved in preparing for and
conducting a jury trial.
In today's world of mass marketing, perhaps there is a need to re-examine the
problem. Perhaps sellers should be allowed to specify the terms on which sales
of products will be made without regard to which party sends off the first
form, 73 subject to (and here there will be disagreement even among the members
of this subcommittee) some carefully worked out limitations on disclaimers and
limitations of liability to restrain the protective drafting enthusiasm of those
representing sellers. Standardized forms bargained between representatives of
sellers and representatives of buyers, such as now exist in some trades, may be
one answer. 74 Perhaps some burden of justification should be placed on sellers
departing from such norms. Perhaps, too, consumers and others buying in small
quantities should have more protection than other buyers. Equally, buying
behemoths should be subject to some limitations on overreaching. The unconscionability rules of U.C.C. section 2-302 have not proved to be the desired
escape valve. Perhaps some less pejorative verbal formula can be found. The
incurable optimism of the average entrepreneur leads to a disregard of what
might go wrong in many cases, so that perhaps leaving the matter to market
forces may not be the answer. Some sort of antidiscrimination approach might
be desirable. In Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, /nc., 75 the Supreme Court
of Idaho rejected evidence that plaintiff had not made similar interest charges to
other purchasers as irrelevant. Yet even Professor Llewellyn's comments,
adopted in the Code comments to U.C.C. section 2-207, seem to refer to a
limitation upon such clauses to be found in variations from "the range of trade
practice." The suggestion made above should not be taken as indicating any
thought that negotiated terms, whether in a form negotiated by industry
representatives for both buyer and seller or in a jointly signed agreement of the
72. See, e.g., Duesenberg, U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and
Documents of Title, 38 Bus. Law 1109, 1115-27 (1983); Id. 37 Bus. Law 949, 955-72 (1982).
73. See, on the subject of general conditions of the contract, 0. Lando, General Conditions of
Contracts, Studies in Scandanavian Law 129 ( 1966); S. Jorgensen, Contract as Form, Studies in
Scandanavian Law 120 (1966).
74. Cf The Worth Street Rules of the textile trade. Professor Leary has participated in three
such exercises, one on behalf of consumers for the standard mortgage forms of the Home Loan
Mortgage Corp., and two on behalf of Pennsylvania's General State Authority for contracts with
architects and with design engineers. Cf also form contract of the Millers' National Federation and
the American Bankers Assoc. at issue in lnt'l Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 110
A.2d 186 (1955), and the standard contract form known as UNIFIN 1959 adopted by the Timber
Trade Federation of the United Kingdom and the Finnish Sawmill Owner's Assoc., and other such
forms of agreement. See also Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971).
75. 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1129, and 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 52 (Idaho 1982).

U.C.C. Survey: Sales

1869

parties, should not stand. It is directed solely to the issue of whether there
should not be some limitation on a seller's general conditions of sale if they are
to be given preference.

WARRANTIES
In addition to the various statute of limit~tions problems discussed hereinafter,76 the intermesh of the Code warranties sect~ons and section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts now must interface with the various products liability
statutes presently in force in at least sixteen states. 77 The problem reached the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 78 a case arising under Michigan law. As the issues involving the
Michigan Products Liability Act 79 were matters of first impression, the federal
court certified three questions to the Michigan Supreme Court. 80 The issues
were: Did the statute apply to actions based on warranty or strict liability? Did
the statute apply to causes of action arising before the statute was enacted? And
did the statute violate the due process clause of the Michigan constitution?
The Michigan Supreme Court answered the first question, ruling that the
statute applied to all actions whether in warranty, strict liability, or negligence,
due to its definition of "products liability action" as "an action based on any
legal or equitable theory of liability brought for or on account of death or injury
to person or property .... " 81 As to the second question, there was no impermissible retroactivity under Michigan rules governing retroactive applications as
the statute, in its substantive provisions, related only to the conduct of the trial
and the application of a rule analogous to comparative negligence. 82 The
statutory provision provided that plaintiff's or decedent's contributory negligence shall not bar recovery, "but the damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. "83 Finally, the last question was answered in the negative. There was no
violation of the Michigan due process clause. 84
76. See infra text accompanying notes 194-202.
77. In Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d, 811 (Pa. 1983), the opinion lists the
following states as "[a]t least sixteen states have adopted products liability statutes of limitation:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon and Tennessee." Id. at 817 n.18.
78. 705 F.2d 164, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1494 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. §§ 600.2945-.2949 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. (West 1983 Supp.).
80. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 382 (Mich. 1982).
81. § 600.2945 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. (West 1983 Supp.). The definition continues "caused
by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of standards,
preparation, processing, assembling, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing,
marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling of a product or component of a product."
82. Section 600.2949(2) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. (West 1983 Supp.) provides for an award of
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "if the court determines a claim or
defense is frivolous." Shouldn't this be the rule in all cases?
83. The Michigan due process clause is expressed in the passive tense: "No person shall be
deprived ... " hence no "state action" is necessarily involved.
84. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 390-91.
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Armed with these answers, the Sixth Circuit disposed of the case on the
merits and reduced plaintifrs recovery. The federal court also found no violation of the federal prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.
Other warranty cases in considerable number involved mostly factual issues,
except for a case on notice to remote manufacturersB 5 and cases on the application of an appropriate statute of limitations,B6 discussed under those topics.

TITLE, CREDITORS, AND GOOD-FAITH PURCHASERS
The more interesting cases under this topic involve the possible scenarios
under U.C.C. section 2-403. First is the "no-title" case, the sale in the absence
of any title. For example, in a sale by one receiving goods from a thief, or one
taking from a thief, the buyer or donee transfers no title. In no-title cases the
true owner recovers. The second is the "voidable-title" sale where there is a
consensual transfer of title but in circumstances giving the transferor grounds to
rescind and revest the title in itself. Where a legal title is thereafter passed by
the transferee to a bona fide purchaser, the purchaser prevails over the equity of
rescission. In the third case, a true owner has parted with less than full title.
This is the "entrusting" situation.B7 The recipients of the transfer, who have the
power but not the right to divest true owner's title, are a more limited class as
they must be "dealers in goods of that kind." Equally, the purchasers are a
more limited kind, namely buyers in the ordinary course of business.BB
The entrusting section gives the power to transfer only the titles of two
persons, that of the entruster and that of the person entrusted with the goods. In
this sense, U.C.C. sections 2-403(2) and (3) are parallel to U.C.C. section 9307( 1) which also divests only two titles, that of the seller and that of the holder
of a security interest created by the seller.
Just as there can be two security interests created by a dealer in the same
goods, one a first and one a second lien, so there can be two entrusters. At least
this is the teaching of In re Woods (Locke v. Woods).B 9 The case involved a car
that was subject to a security interest in a bank. The car was returned by the
debtor to the dealer from whom it had been purchased, to be sold. On disputed
evidence, the court held that the first secured party was aware of the return at
some relevant point in time. The dealer sold the car to a buyer in ordinary
85. See i12fra text accompanying notes 146-48.
86. See i12fra text accompanying notes 194-202.
87. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) ( 1978) provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business."
Subsection (3) states: "'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of
possession regardless .... "
88. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978) defining "Buyer in ordinary course of business," requires that the
buyer buy "in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind .... "
Buying "does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a
money debt."
89. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 256 Bankr. E.D. Tenn. (1982).
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course, who financed with a credit union. The dealer became bankrupt before
remitting the proceeds. The bank refused to surrender the title papers. The
ultimate purchasers sued for a declaratory judgment.
The bankruptcy judge stated that the ultimate buyers could not prevail under
U.C.C. section 9-307( 1) as the bank's security interest was created by the first
buyer, not the dealer selling to the ultimate buyer. The judge was also aware of
cases to the effect that a buyer who cannot prevail under U.C.C. section
9-307(1) cannot prevail under U.C.C. section 2-403(2). 90 But this is not the
entire story. A buyer who might not prevail under U.C.C. section 9-307( 1) can
prevail under U.C.C. section 9-306(2) if the secured party has "otherwise"
authorized the sale. 91
Also, under U.C.C. section 2-403(3), entrusting is committed not only by
anyone who delivers possession, but also by anyone who "acquiesces" in
retention of possession. Hence, a secured party who acquiesces in the retention
of possession by a dealer in goods of that kind has entrusted his interest in the
goods to the dealer, even though the security interest was created by another
who had also entrusted his equity.
This was the conclusion of the bankruptcy judge in In re Woods. 92 He felt
that there could be difficulties in finding an "authorization" for the sale under
U.C.C. section 9-306(2) from mere acquiescence in the dealer's retention of
possession, stating: "The secured party who knows of the debtor's delivery of
the collateral to a merchant for sale cannot lie in wait until the merchant has
misled some innocent buyer and then recover the collateral on the ground that it
did not authorize the sale in writing." 93
Whether the bank's knowledge of the return of the car to the dealer constitutes "acquiescence" in the dealer's retention of possession is another question.
In view of the decisions under U.C.C. section 9-306(2) on what constitutes an
authorization "otherwise,'' 94 there may be recoveries under U.C.C. sections 290. E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 236 A.2d 484, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1021 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1967) and progeny.
91. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978) provides that a disposition by the debtor does not divest a
perfected security interest "unless the disposition was authorized ... in the security agreement or
otherwise .... "
92. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 256 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
93. Id. at 265.
94. See, e.g., Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 111 III. App.2d 190, 249 N.E. 2d
352, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 940 (1969); Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 593 P.2d 167, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1346 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
1979) North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co. 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35, 23
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1343 (1978); Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 251
N.W.2d 321, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 315 (1976); Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n
v. Izzard, 111 Ill. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E. 2d 352, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 940 (1969);
Overland Nat'l Bank of Grand Island v. Aurora Coop. Elevator Co., J 84 Neb. 843, 172 N.W.2d
786, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 11 (1969) (all refusing to find that the prohibition in the
security agreement against selling without secured party's consent was waived by a course of dealing
where secured party routinely accepted proceeds of unauthorized sales). Note that immediately after
the contrary decision in Clovis Nat'! Bank v. Thomas, 425 P.2d, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
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403(2) and (3) when there would not be under U.C.C. section 9-306(2). Or
should the two rules be made identical?
A similar but different fact pattern was before the court in Ocean City
National Bank v. Palmer, 95 involving a twenty-two-foot pleasure craft. The
dealer sold the boat to Palmer, retaining a security interest which the dealer
assigned to Ocean County Bank. The interest was perfected by the filing of a
financing statement. Palmer returned the boat to the dealer to sell and pay off
the bank. The dealer sold, retained a security interest which it discounted with
another bank, and failed to remit the proceeds to the first bank. Then the dealer
filed for bankruptcy.
As Ocean City National Bank apparently had no knowledge of the return to
the dealer, acquiescence was not argued. U.C.C. section 2-403(2) was used in a
closing statement in the opinion to the effect that if Palmer had any equity in
the boat it belonged to the buyers. But they had created a security interest in
that equity. Short shrift was given an argument that since Palmer's security
interest was from Palmer to the dealer, the interest in the dealer's assignee was
a security interest created by the dealer by assignment. "Not so," said the court;
it was created by Palmer, and the Ocean City Bank prevailed as first claimant to
the sale proceeds.
In re Seiler, 96 decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, held that a buyer was a buyer in ordinary course despite the fact that
the selling dealer had not received the certificate of title from his seller. Hence,
the buyer had priority over a state tax lien asserted against the dealer when it
received the title certificate endorsed to it. The court protected the buyer by
virtue of the policy of U.C.C. sections 2-403 and 9-307(1 ), although it is
difficult to visualize a state tax lien as a security interest created by the dealer.
In fact, it was created by the revenue department against the dealer. A holding
that, since the sale by the dealership had occurred before the attachment date of
the tax lien, the car was not the dealer's property on that date would have
provided a better analysis.
A most interesting entrusting case is Exxon Company v. TL W Computer
Industries, /nc. 97 Two of the defendants, both Boston Stock Exchange corporations (Stock Exchanges), 98 desired to repla.ce some of their computers with
newer but still used equipment. They asked TLW to obtain for them an IBM
370/155, which it did not then own. In July 1977, an agreement for sale at a
price of $310,000 was made with TLW, although Stock Exchanges knew that
TLW did not then own one. Later in July, TLW learned that Exxon wanted to
137 (N. Mex. Sup. Ct. 1967), the New Mexico legislature, by nonuniform amendment to its UCC,
made provision to prevent the decision from being followed, by adding to § 9-306(2) the sentence:
"A security interest in farm products and the proceeds thereof shall not be considered waived by any
party by any course of dealing between the parties or by any trade usage."
95. 457 A.2d 1225, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983).
96. 29 Bankr. 33, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
97. CA 79-21 lOT (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1983). Appeal pending.
98. These two defendants appear to have acted as one in the transaction and will be referred to
together hereafter.
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dispose of an IBM 370/155. Exxon entered into an agreement with TLW,
entitled "Equipment Lease Agreement," with payments of $11 ,000 a month
and an option price at the end of the term of $167,000.
On August 12, 1977, on Exxon's premises, IBM employees packed the
equipment for shipment, arranged by TLW, to Stock Exchanges in Baytown,
Massachusetts. This was a violation of the lease agreement with Exxon, and
apparently Exxon did not know where the computer was located until February
of 1978. TL W was in financial difficulties and was not able to work out any
purchase arrangement with Exxon. A conversion action was then instituted by
Exxon, after demand and refusal to surrender, against Stock Exchanges and
others.
Stock Exchanges defended on two grounds. The first, with which we are not
concerned, was that the Exxon-TL W contract was not a lease but a conditional
sale. On this ground they were not successful. The second defense was that
TLW was a dealer in previously owned computers, and that Exxon had
entrusted the computer to TLW. Stock Exchanges asserted that they were
buyers in ordinary course and hence had acquired not only TL W's title but also
Exxon's title under U.C.C. sections 2-403(2) and (3). Exxon's response was
that Stock Exchanges were not buyers in ordinary course because they did not
purchase the goods out of inventory. 99 This suggestion the court refused to
adopt, citing as support for its refusal In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 100 where the sale was by the dealership, but off premises, and the item sold
had not been seen in the dealership's inventory by the buyer.
The district judge nevertheless ruled that Stock Exchanges were not buyers in
ordinary course, apparently on the ground that the provision was intended to
protect "innocent" purchasers. It then followed that whether Stock Exchanges
were innocent was a factual determination. 101 The judge then cited three reasons
to support his "factual" determination. They were: first, that TLW did not
have an IBM 370/155 in inventory at the time of the sale; second, the
transaction involved a significant amount of money; and third, Stock Exchanges
were "sophisticated business" entities. He concluded: "To permit Clearing and
Service [Stock Exchanges] to rely with impunity on TLW's undocumented
warranty of title of a used computer, not in inventory, and never seen or
inspected prior to delivery, would allow them to benefit from their own
imprudence." 102 Strangely, the judge did not discuss, nor did he refer to the
definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in U.C.C. section 1-201 (9).

99. Exxon relied on the "out of inventory" language in comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-403 (1978),
stating that the policy of the sections is to gather various pre-Code protections "into a single
principle protecting persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory."
100. 25 Bankr. 377, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 268 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982),
discussed hereinafter on other points.
101. The District Judge cited U.C.C. § 2-403, comment 2 for this statement, but the word
"innocent" nowhere appears in the comment.
102. Exxon Co. v. TLW Computer Indus., Inc., CA 79-21 lOT (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1983).
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Yet his conclusions could fit the definition, perhaps, under either of two
elements of that definition.
The first is "good faith." U.C.C. section 2-103( 1 )(b) defines "good faith" in
the case of a merchant as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Conceivably a court could be
comfortable with applying only a subjective standard where a merchant buys
under U.C.C. section 9-307(1 ), thereby divesting a security interest, and an
objective standard under U.C.C. sections 2-403(2) and (3) when the purchase
divests the interest of a true owner. Or should the standard be the same?
The second, and perhaps sounder, approach would be to concentrate on the
words "buys in ordinary course." The words are in addition to the requirement
of "good faith" and must mean something in addition. This, however, would be
a factual issue and would require evidence as to what constitutes "the ordinary
course of business" in the particular trade. 103
A limitation to "out of inventory" at the time of negotiation of the deal would
unduly limit the scope of protection of all "special order" buyers and would
unduly limit the phrase in the definition that "Buying ... includes receiving
goods ... under a pre-existing contract for sale." 10•
In addition to the problem of the off-premises sale, In re Morristown
Lincoln-Mercury, lnc. 105 stated, in a U.C.C. section 9-307 context, that a sale
by a lessee-dealer should divest the lessor's interest as well as a secured party's
interest, despite the issuance of a certificate of title. 106
One no-title case involved a purchase of a truck from a police department by
a dealer who then sold the truck to an individual in May 1976. 107 Five years
later an officer of the police department seized the truck to return it to the true
owner from whom it had been stolen before the police department first seized
and sold it. Plaintiff buyer from the dealer filed a creative suit against the
seizing officer for violation of plaintiff's civil rights. A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action failed, the court ruling that in Pennsylvania
possession is prima facie evidence of ownership so plaintiff was, at the least,
entitled to a hearing before being deprived of possession of the truck. One

103. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 254, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 93 (D. Mass. 1970), also can be justified as giving meaning to "in ordinary
course." The sale was made before a used car auction, outside the auction premises, in a state where
neither buyer nor seller did business.
104. Note that U.C.C. § 2-106 (1978) includes in the definition of "Contract for sale" both a
present sale and a contrac1 to sell at a future time, the usual circumstance in a special order
purchase as well as other types.
105. Bankr. E.D. Tenn., 25 BR 391 (1982).
106. The bankruptcy judge distinguished Manufacturer's Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Knoxville, 324 S. W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1959), which upheld the claim of a prior interest noted on a certificate
of title because in that case all parties knew they were dealing with a second-hand car. Here the
buyer did not know that it had previously been sold by the dealer to its vice-president or that a
certificate of title was outstanding.
107. Justice v. Fahey, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 515 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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wonders what success a suit against the police for breach of warranty of title
would have had if brought by the dealer from whom the truck was purchased.
There are gambits, sometimes successful, that may be used under the entrusting section of the U.C.C. A buyer in ordinary course of business must buy in
good faith. The U.C.C. definition is "honesty in fact." 108 But this has not
prevented a gloss from developing where certain actions or situations show that
further factual investigations may not have been made for fear of what would be
uncovered. In R.H. Macy's N.Y., Inc. v. Equitable Diamond Corp., 109 Macy's
sold a ring to Ms. Marie Draper for $9,742.50. Ms. Draper's check was later
dishonored for insufficient funds, giving Macy's a right of reclamation under the
cash sale rule and Ms. Draper a voidable title. She sold the ring to Equitable
Diamond Co. for $2,500. The court ruled that a triable issue existed on these
facts as to Equitable's good faith. The "extremely low price" may not have been
as low as the court indicated. Equitable sold for $4,000 to another dealer, who
then sold to a third dealer for $4,900. The price among dealers would be a
wholesale buying rate. The $4,000 and $4,900 were in the neighborhood of fifty
percent of Macy's retail price. Hence, Equitable had purchased at between
fifty-one percent and sixty-two percent of wholesale selling price, assuming that
the sale between the second and third dealers was at the wholesale market price.
But if facts about the proper markups were not before the court, then denial of
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was proper.
Another successful attack on good faith was mounted in Liles Bros. & Sons v.
Wright. 110 Representing himself to be a farmer, Mangum bought a backhoe
from Liles Bros. for $20,561. Mangum then switched roles and, representing
himself as a dealer, sold the backhoe to Wright, who operated a septic tank
service, for $11,000.m When Mangum's check to Liles for $17,561 bounced,
Liles Bros. traced the backhoe to Wright, who refused to give it up. In the
ensuing litigation, the issue turned on Wright's good-faith-purchaser status as
against Liles Bros.' claim to rescind and repossess the backhoe. Wright won in
the trial court, as farmers usually do. Both the intermediate appellate court and
the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled there was no evidence to support the
finding that Wright was a bona fide purchaser and the trial court was reversed.
Several factors swayed the appellate courts. The first was the low price to a
purchaser who had been shopping for just such a backhoe and was familiar with
values. He owned two other backhoes and was familiar with their values as
well. Second, there was no printed letterhead on the bill of sale given by
Mangum. Finally, Wright made no inquiries as to Mangum's business location
or how to reach him after the sale. Wright was aware of a rash of heavy
equipment scams in the Tennessee-Kentucky area, but only remarked that he
hoped the backhoe wasn't stolen. The courts might have observed that while the
108. u.c.c. § 1-201(19) (1978).
109. 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 896 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
110. 638 S.W.2d 383, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1174 (Tenn. 1982).
111. It is startling that complicated scams will be committed for so little profit. Here the crook
paid out $3,000 and recovered $11,000, or a net of $8,000, less expenses.

1876

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 39, August 1984

definition of good faith as "honesty in fact" may have adopted "the law of the
white heart and the fat head," it was never intended that the head could be that
fat.112
Where there is a delivery in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, the purchaser
cannot be a buyer in ordinary course of business, but he can be a bona fide
purchaser. Where the entrusting also involved a transfer of title, even though
the transaction of resale supported a criminal conviction, the teaching of Davis
v. C.B. Livestock Co. 113 is that a bona fide purchaser from one with a voidable
title will still prevail. Yet, when a crook delivered goods obtained wrongfully
from his employer by diverting a shipment through altering shipping instructions, the crook, even though a salesman in the employ of the true owner,
obtained no title. Thus, in Textile Supplies, Inc. v. Garrett, 114 the Fifth Circuit
panel permitted the true owner to recover the price of the goods which the
innocent purchaser of "no title" had resold.

TENDER, CURE AND NOTICE OF BREACH
U.C.C. section 2-601 embodies the pre-Code rule of "perfect tender," while
U.C.C. section 2-612 espouses a rule of substantial performance. As Professor
Llewellyn pointed out, Mr. Hiram Thomas knew why the "perfect tender rule
was right for 'one delivery' contracts and the substantial performance rule was
right for installment contracts," but Professor Llewellyn had forgotten just why,
and Thomas' unfortunate death prevented him from refreshing Professor Llewellyn's memory. 115 Professor Llewellyn also died still unable to recall just why,
but adamant in his conviction that the distinction was right and that Mr.
Thomas had once convinced all listeners thereof.
Courts faced with a literal reading of U.C.C. section 2-601 's "if the goods or
the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract" continue to
debate over the application of these words in particular cases. One concern is the
belief that a devious buyer could always find some defect in the goods or their
tender to avoid what has unexpectedly turned out to be a bad bargain, but not
bad enough to excuse performance under U.C.C. section 2-615 or otherwise.
This concern apparently influenced the Indiana Court of Appeals in National
Fleet Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild. 116 The trial court found that Fairchild had
ordered "a Cummins NT 270 long block diesel engine" which National had
contracted to supply but had delivered a 250. In a footnote to its statement of the
rule of U.C.C. section 2-601 the court remarked: "Despite the code's apparent
insistence on perfect tender, it is generally understood that rejection is not
112. Indeed, the facts would permit the inference that farmer Wright deliberately failed to
investigate for fear of what he might find out; this is a well-known formulation for lack of subjective
good faith.
113. 41 Agric. Dec. 942, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
114. 687 F.2d 123, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900 (5th Cir. 1982).
115. As reported by Professor Grant Gilmore, ALI-ABA Transcript of Advanced Course on
Banking and Secured Transactions, New Orleans, Feb. 1-4, 1967 (1968), 145.
116. 450 N.E.2d 1015, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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available in circumstances where the goods or delivery fail in some respect to
conform to the terms of the sales contract." 117
Notwithstanding the words of Professors White and Summers, the understanding is not so general. In Texas Imports v. Allday, 118 a sale-of-cattle case, a
jury found that four out of forty-three heifers were not sound due to "double
muscling." The condition would make calving difficult. The jury had also made
a finding of substantial performance. The holding was that the submission of a
special interrogatory on substantial performance was improper, the court saying
The finding made in Special Issue No. 1 is not an issue controlling an
ultimate fact since the doctrine of substantial performance is not applicable
under § 2.601 which controls this breach of contract dispute under the facts
in the record. The so-called 'perfect tender rule' is expressed in the
language of said section, and '[t]here is no room in commercial contracts
for the doctrine of substantial performance.' 119
It has always been understood that the Code has, by its concept of cure in
U.C.C. section 2-508, created some undermining of the perfect tender rule. Less
frequently discussed is the potential effect of U.C.C. section 2-504 on the
tender-of-delivery aspect of U.C.C. section 2-601. In Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v.
Daewoo International (America) Corp., 120 a minor part of the case 121 involved
Daewoo's claim that the following instruction to the jury was prejudicial,
namely: " 'A buyer has no duty to accept goods or pay for them unless there has
been a proper tender of delivery. If the tender of delivery fails in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may reject the goods.' " 122 An instruction was
also given that for Daewoo to recover, it must establish that it had been
damaged by defendant's breach. This was followed by an instruction based on
the postamble to U.C.C. section 2-504 which provides "Failure to ... make a
proper contract [for transportation] under paragraph (a) is a ground for
rejection only if material delay or loss ensues." Daewoo claimed that there was
a conflict between U.C.C. section 2-601 and U.C.C. section 2-504 and that the
jury should have been told that U.C.C. section 2-504 controlled. There had been
a rejection, Monte Carlo claiming the documents necessary to clear the shipment (through customs) arrived too late for the Christmas sales. There was
admittedly a one-day delay in shipment by Daewoo. Monte Carlo sued for, and

117. Id. at 1017 n.4, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 484 n.4 (citation omitted).
118. 649 S.W.2d 731, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 491 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); accord
Atlan Indus. v. O.E.M., Inc., SSS F. Supp. 184, 3S U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 79S (W.D.
Okla. 1983); Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 3S U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130
(N.M. 1982).
119. 649 S.W.2d at 737-38, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 498 (citations omitted).
120. 707 F.2d 10S4, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 487 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. The big money was involved in Monte Carlo's claim for trademark infringement when
Daewoo's American affiliate resold the shirts to discount houses with Monte Carlo's labels and
polybags intact. Monte Carlo lost on the claim.
122. 707 F.2d at 1059, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 489.
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the jury awarded, $79,073 for lost profits. Daewoo appealed, having properly
objected to the instructions.
The Ninth Circuit, at first blush, might seem to have confused the right to
reject with the question of whether the breach caused damages. If Monte Carlo
had a right to reject under U.C.C. section 2-601, could it do so whether the
breach by Daewoo caused damages or not? The rejection would leave Daewoo
with the goods and Monte Carlo with its money if it had not paid in advance.
But if the one-day delay caused Monte Carlo to lose the Christmas sales on
2400 dozen men's shirts, it could be classed as a material loss. The court felt
that the instruction to the effect that losses, to be recoverable, must be caused by
the breach, bridged the gap, as the requirement of causality, it said, was as
stringent as materiality. How else is the intermesh of U.C.C. section 2-504 and
U.C.C. section 2-601 to be satisfied? Yet a problem results if buyer can reject
for a late shipment only if, when suing as plaintiff, a material loss caused
thereby can be proved, or if seller agrees that such a loss could be proved and
accepts the rejection. Under this interpretation of U.C.C. section 2-504's postamble, for a seller to reject for a delayed delivery, a rather prompt estimate of
damages to determine "materiality" is required. Otherwise buyer, after an
acceptance of the goods would, under U.C.C. section 2-607(2), be limited to
Code remedies other than rejection or revocation of acceptance. This seems to
result in another undermining of the perfect tender rule.
The major undermining of the perfect tender rule was accomplished by the
Code's right to cure under the two parts of U.C.C. section 2-508. The question
of the timing of the offer to cure is of some importance as is the question of a
seller's reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable. Subsection
(1) requires that both the notification of intent to cure and the replacement
delivery be made before the expiration of the time for a performance. Subsection
(2), however, provides "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which
the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without
money allowance the seller may, if he seasonably notifies the buyer, have a
further reasonable time fo substitute a conforming tender." 123
There are grammatical troubles with subsection (2) that were faced by the
New York Court of Appeals in T. W. Oil Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. 124 The
case involved a substantia! delivery of fuel oil for electric generating plants. The
contract called for oil with 0.5 % or less sulphur content. Seller tendered oil
after having received a refinery certificate that the sulphur content of the
tendered oil was 0.52 % . There was a trade custom to round off specifications of
sulphur content at 1 % , 0.5 % , and 0.3 % . When the oil arrived and was tested
by independent testers, the sulphur content was found to be 0.92 % . Negotiations on a price adjustment followed but broke down. A day after the negotiations broke down and about three weeks after the last day for delivery under
purchase contract, seller offered to cure by a delivery of conforming oil to arrive
123. u.c.c. § 2-508(2) (1978).
124. 443 N.E.2d 932, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 12 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).
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one week later and thus about four weeks after the last date for delivery under
the contract. This offer defendant rejected. The original contract price was
$3,360,667.14. T.W. Oil, Inc. sold the oil at $1,385,512.83 below the contract
price and sued for that amount. There had been an approximately twenty-five
percent drop in the market price for "spot" oil between that prevailing when the
contract was made and the date of the negotiations. Leave to appeal from a
unanimous decision of the appellate division was granted. The judgments below
sustaining the seller's right to cure were affirmed.
One of the grammatical problems with U.C.C. section 2-508(2) was not
before the court. The last phrase, "further reasonable time," does not make
clear from what point in time this further period is to run. The logical answer is
from the notice which must be given within a reasonable time after the rejection
or from the agreed time if one is in the contract. 125
The second grammatical question is what is the full antecedent of the
pronoun "which" introducing the clause requiring the seller to have reasonable
grounds to believe in its acceptability? Or, as the issue was phrased by the court,
may a post-performance-day cure be tendered by a seller "who acting in good
faith and without knowledge of any defect" 126 made a tenqer that was in fact
nonconforming and properly rejected? The court of appeals did not take "nonconforming tender" as the antecedent, only the word "tender." In its analysis of
the facts, however, the court seemed to find that even if the seller knew the
tender was nonconforming, it would have had reasonable grounds for believi11g
that such a nonconforming tender would have been acceptable, pointing to
seller's undisputed knowledge that defendant had previously used 0. 92 % qi!
and that defendant had been willing to accept the oil at a twenty-five-percent
price reduction.
Defendant, however, relying on one textbook on the law of sales, 127 urged the
court to rule that U.C.C. section 2-508(2) was limited to cure by seller's
knowingly making an accommodation nonconforming tender. The court stated
that the few decisions extant on the issue adopted a position opposed to that of
the defendant, as did "the mainstream of scholarly comment on the subject." 128
The court stressed that U.C.C. section 2-508 was "intended to act as a
meaningful limitation on the absolutism of the old perfect tender rule," 129 and

125. See the definition of "seasonably." U.C.C. § 1-204(3) (1978).
126. 443 N.E.2d at 934, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 14.
127. Nordstrom, Law of Sales§ 105 (1970).
128. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 178 (D.C. Ct. App.
1967); Appleton v. Lee, 148 N.W.2d (1967); cf Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968), see infra, articles cited at note
129.
129. 1955 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., at 484;]. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-4, at 322 (2d ed. 1980); 3 Anderson, Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-508:7 (2d eq.); Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales
and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 12-13 ( 1962); Note,
Commercial Law-The Effect of the Seller's Right to Cure on the Buyer's Remedy of Rescission, 28
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also stressed the Code's provisions for liberal construction of remedial provis10ns.
Also worthy of consideration is the fact that the cure rule (no matter which
way it is interpreted) places a considerable restraint on the ability of a buyer
receiving a nonconforming tender to move promptly to effect cover. This is
especially true when lead times for delivery may be lengthening and supplies
growing scarcer. Also, in a rising market, a wait to receive the seasonable notice
and the further reasonable time for the substitute delivery can seriously affect
the amount of money placed at risk of litigation, especially if the substitute
delivery should also turn out to be defective. A buyer here has several decisions
to make. The buyer must estimate the reasonable time for a notification of
intent to cure, the seller's reasonable belief, and the like. Fortunately, the
comment indicates that, if the bargaining position permits, a buyer can contract
against there being any right to cure. Yet here, too, there is trouble, as the
comment also indicates that such a clause may operate only as to the reasonableness of the seller's belief in acceptability.
Assuming a right to reject, it can be lost upon buyer's "acceptance" of the
goods. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are numerous cases involving the
question whether particular conduct on the part of the buyer constituted an
acceptance of the goods. In Columbia Can Co. of New jersey v. Africa-Middle
East Marketing, /nc., 130 the seller had shipped nonconforming goods to a
location designated by the buyer. Subsequent to their arrival, the buyer requested transshipment by the seller to another location. When the transshipment occurred, the buyer had not yet inspected the goods which were moved
with the original packaging unopened. In its suit for the purchase price, the
seller persuaded the trial court that the transshipment constituted an act
inconsistent with the seller's ownership under U.C.C. section 2-606(1 ),(c). The
transshipment exposed the goods to outside storage for a period before they were
again returned to the original location. The New Jersey Appellate Division
reversed on three grounds. As to acceptance, the court adopted and quoted
Professors White's and Summers' theory that, "Under no circumstances should
an act of the buyer in ignorance of the defective nature of the goods be held
'inconsistent with the seller's ownership.' " 131 This, however, was at bes~ one of
three alternate holdings. The court felt that the trial court should have considered also whether there had been a valid revocation of any acceptance. In
addition, the court said that acceptance did not deprive buyer of its rights to
assert a claim for breach of warranty. As the defect, rust on the inside of
containers, rendered the goods worthless, all avenues led to the same result: the
buyer had no liability for the purchase price. The court further justified its
reversal by saying:

Ark. L. Rev. 297 (1974); Note, Seller's Right to Cure Non-Conforming Goods, 6 Rut.-Cam. L. Rev.
387 (1974).
130. 455 A.2d 1143, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 137 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
131. Id. at 1147, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 143.
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We note finally that the Commercial Code is not a recondite, obtuse or
abstract document imposing irrational burdens upon commercial transactions. It is rather intended to conform to and codify the expectations,
realities and common sense experience of the commercial community. It
defies common sense for this buyer under the circumstances here to have to
pay this seller for the defective goods. The Code does not require such a
result and neither should the courts. 132
In addition to a rejecting buyer, a buyer who revokes acceptance must also be
concerned about a continued exercise of incidents of ownership as to the goods.
If such actions are viewed as inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the
goods, they would then vitiate the revocation of acceptance. Frequently, however, a buyer, especially a consumer buyer, after giving the notice of revocation,
has no real choice but to continue using the goods until a replacement can be
secured. McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, /nc. 133 was such a case.
Involved was the buyer's continuing need for transportation after giving a notice
of revocation of acceptance that was not agreed to by the seller. The buyer
continued to operate the automobile until the time of trial, adding 23,000 miles
to the odometer. The seller claimed retraction of the revocation of acceptance,
but the Ohio Supreme Court joined other state courts 134 and adopted a reasonable use test as an issue of fact for the trier of fact. In applying the test, the court
said:

[T]he trier of fact should pose and divine answers to the following queries:
(1) Upon being apprised of buyer's revocation of his acceptance, what
instructions, if any, did the seller tender the buyer concerning return of the
now rejected goods? (2) Did the buyer's business needs or personal
circumstances compel the continued use? (3) During the period of such
use, did the seller persist in assuring the buyer that all nonconformities
would be cured or that provisions would otherwise be made to recompense
the latter for the dissatisfaction and inconvenience which the defects caused
him? ( 4) Did the seller act in good faith? ( 5) Was the seller unduly
prejudiced by the buyer's continued use? 135
With respect, the court's battery of questions is not very helpful in advising
clients. The first question, giving instructions as to the return of the car, is not
something a seller contesting the propriety of the attempted revocation of
132. Id. at 1148, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 144.
133. 449 N.E.2d 1289, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 513 (Ohio 1983).
134. Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304
N.W.2d 654, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 558 (Minn. 1981); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 382
A.2d 954, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 929 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); O'Shea v. Hatch,
640 P.2d 515, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 561 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Mobile Homes Sales
Management, Inc. v. Brown, 562 P.2d 1378, 21 U.C.C Rep. (Callaghan) 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977).
135. 449 N.E.2d at 1293, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 518-19.
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acceptance would do lest such action prejudice its position in any subsequent
litigation. Also, if the seller said, "Park the car on my lot and give me the keys,
and if your law suit is successful against me some three years from now, I'll pay
whatever the court orders me to pay," the buyer needing transportation could
not comply. The third question, if it occurs, could be either warranty performance, or work done for a fee which could occur regardless. The reference to
good faith in the fourth question is, of course, to the article 2 definition of a
merchant's good faith, which includes the observance of "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing," a thing very hard to prove.
The real issues seem to lie with the answer to the second question, namely,
the needs and financial condition of the buyer, and the fifth, prejudice to the
seller. In the case of an automobile, in our present society, where in many areas
there is no public transportation, the second item is crucial. Too few workers
can continue paying on one car as to which acceptance has been revoked and
return the car to the dealer pending suit, while simultaneously making a down
payment and carrying installment payments on a second car. The fifth test can
usually be satisfied by allowing a value-of-use offset to the seller. The majority
of the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the seller recover nothing for the 23,000
mile use, as it had introduced no evidence of the value of such use. 136
The seller also made the interesting argument that the quantum of the
buyer's use after giving notice of revocation of acceptance was a strong indication that the vehicle's nonconformities did not substantially impair its value to
the buyer. Aside from the fact that the trier of fact had found against the seller,
the court flatly stated that the inference contended for by the seller could not be
drawn. Substantial impairment, said the court,
is a determination exclusively within the purview of the fact-finder and
must be based on objective evidence of the buyer's idiosyncratic tastes and
needs .... Any defect that shakes the buyer's faith or undermines his
confidence in the reliability and integrity of the purchased item is deemed
to work a substantial impairment of the item's value and to provide a basis
for revocation of the underlying sales agreement. 137
The seller's claim that the warranties and the vehicle service contract constituted the buyer's sole remedy was also unsuccessful. The court stated that the
limited remedy had clearly failed of its essential purpose when attempts made
over twelve months did not effect a cure.
136. One judge dissented, stating that the introduction of such evidence was not to be expected of
one litigating on the basis of a waiver of the revocation of acceptance. Id. at 1295, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. at 522 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But doesn't such a dilemma exist for every defendant asserting
inconsistent defenses, where one cannot be true if the other is?
137. Id. at 1294, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 520-21. The defects were recurrent brake failings,
steering malfunctions, and other mechanical difficulties, and the fact that the fixing of one often
appeared to be the cause of another defect "as well as the utter frustration caused by the seemingly
endless array of cosmetic flaws, constituted non-conformities giving rise to the remedy of revocation." Id. at 1294, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 520-21.
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Each year issues as to notice of breach under U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a)
arise. The subsection, it is true, does have a lot of work to do as it covers any
possible type of breach with the words "any breach." Yet the type of notice
required varies with the nature of the breach. Also there is a repetition between
the provisions in U.C.C. section 2-602 that a rejection "is ineffective" unless the
buyer timely notifies the seller and in U.C.C. section 2-608(2) that a revocation
of acceptance is "ineffective" until the buyer notifies the seller of it, and the
blanket "any breach" rule of U.C.C. section 2-607(3 )(a). The safe course to
pursue is to interpret "notify the seller of breach," to require that some
indication of the nature of the breach be given. The comment to U.C.C. section
2-607(3 )(a) requires only a notice sufficient "to let the seller know that the
transaction is still troublesome and must be watched." This is fine for breach of
warranty, but will not do for other types of breach, delayed delivery, failure to
allocate supplies properly under U.C.C. section 2-61 S(b), an "indication" under
U.C.C. section 2-611(1) that a repudiation is considered final, and the like.
Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. 138 makes the point that notice is
required regardless of the nature of the breach. Relying on the language "any
breach," in U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a), the court rejected the buyer's contention
that the subsection required notice only when the goods were defective. According to the court, "the same policies which support a rule requiring notice of
breach when a latent defect is discovered also support a rule requiring notice of
breach when performance does not conform to time or price terms of the
contract. " 139
In Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co. 140 the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida was faced with a notice question in a motion to dismiss an
action for personal injuries based on a breach of warranty claim. There was no
Florida decision to guide the court. The judge noted that the cases were divided,
citing two rulings that notice is not a precondition, 141 and three for what was
said to "appear" to be the majority view where the plaintiff, if a "buyer," must
allege compliance with U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a). 142 Here plaintiff had not
alleged any contractual relationship with defendant on anybody's part. The
court ruled that the complaint for breach of warranty was deficient in not
alleging that plaintiff was either a buyer or a warranty beneficiary under
Florida's adoption of alternative A of U.C.C. section 2-318. The judge then
pointed out two exceptions to the rule of notice, referring to a line of Florida
cases holding that a direct action against a manufacturer can be brought without
138. 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1435 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. Id. at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1462.
140. 555 F. Supp. 59, 35 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 391 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
141. Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1208 (W.Va. 1980); Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 68
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
142. Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 985 (N.C.
1981); Branden v. Gerbie, 379 N.E.2d 7, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 152 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 10 (Or.
1973).
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notice, 143 and to another group of cases holding that warranty beneficiaries need
not give notice. 144 The latter cases were based upon a literal reading of U.C.C.
section 2-607(3 )(a)'s use of the word "buyer" only and disregarded, as unduly
expanding the text of the statute, the comment's suggestion that "the reason of
the section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an
injury has occurred." 145
The notice exception as to suits against remote manufacturers came before
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Firestone Tire b Rubber Co. v.
Cannon. 146 The case involved only economic loss to trucker Cannon caused by a
blow-out of the tire occurring just seven days after its installation by a "seller."
A number of sellers were involved. The tire was purchased by Cannon from
Elliott Equipment Company, which had acquired it from Swann Tire Center.
Swann's personnel installed the tire at Elliott's facility. Swann had acquired the
tire from Commercial Tire Co., which in turn had purchased from Seiberling
Tire Co., a subsidiary of Firestone, the manufacturer. The name Seiberling was
on the tire. The suit was for damages to the truck and $8,000 loss of profits
during the fourteen weeks the truck was undergoing repairs.
Within a few days after the accident, Cannon notified Elliott, but no notice
was given to Swann, Commercial, Seiberling, or Firestone until the suit was
filed two years later. At some time thereafter the action against the two local
companies, Elliott and Swann, was dropped.
The verdict of the jury was on the plaintiff's breach of warranty theory.
Firestone appealed on the ground of lack of notice. It claimed that direct notice
to it was necessary, showing that it had been prejudiced by the lack of notice
because evidence, including the rim of the wheel on which the defective tire was
mounted, and debris from the tire, had been lost. The evidence was vital to
Firestone's claim that there was no breach of warranty, only faulty installation.
This defense, Firestone urged, created a conflict of interest between itself and
the installer, making it in the installer's interest not to give early notice.
The court discussed the division of authority existing on the issue of notice to
a remote seller. The majority sided with the cases dispensing with direct notice
on the theory that notice to the immediate seller will be passed up the chain of
distribution with claims for indemnity.
Judge Lowe, in a separate opinion, pointed out that [i]n a society surviving
on mass production, the removal of the privity shield exposed the financial
stability of manufacturers by creating an entire new vista of suits by plaintiffs
143. 555 F. Supp. at 63, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at. 396.
144. Simmons v. Clemen Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1088 (Ala.
1979); Mattos v. Hash, 368 A.2d 993, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 473 (Md. Ct. App. 1977);
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 371 (Md. Ct.
App. 1976); Chaffin v. Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
145. U.C.C. § 2-607, comment 5 (1978). It seems that the American courts are not yet ready to
interpret the Code as a code from which principles can be distilled and applied. Nor do the courts
seem to be adopting the interpretive suggestions set forth in U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1 (1978).
146. 452 A.2d 192, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
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and a fruitful field for specialization in the legal profession." 147 Judge Lowe
then pointed out that the present case showed the need for direct notice to the
manufacturer since there was a clear conflict of interest between the installer
and the manufacturer. He felt that procedural fairness, in view of the potential
for conflict of interest between manufacturers and installers, required a rule of
prompt notice to the manufacturer upon discovery of its name. As to this, he
said, "Procedural fair play, like procedural due process must be equally
provided not only to the poor or individual consumers but to the rich and
corporate goliaths as well." 148
Strangely, in the cases on the issue of notice to remote sellers, no distinction
has been made between products such as tires and many others which carry the
name of the manufacturer and products or components which do not. Since we
no longer insist (with some exceptions) upon a chain of privity for direct suit by
reason of the use of the term "buyer" or "seller," so we should no longer insist
upon an up-the-chain system of notice where selfish interest can be served by an
installer's failure to give notice. 149 There is enough interpretative flexibility in
the term "reasonable time" in U.C.C. section 2-607(3 )(a) for a court to rule
that the time runs from the discovery of the name, if the name of a remote seller
or manufacturer is not on the product. But the potentiality for conflict of interest
between manufacturer and immediate seller, especially when the latter can be
dropped from the case, weighs heavily against the justice of a rule totally
dispensing with notice. 150

REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
The two topics, repudiation and excuse, have met a judicial reluctance to
expand the rather restricted common law scope given to each.
At common law, courts appeared to have difficulty with the concept that there
could be an exercise of remedies against a party before that party is supposed to
start performing. Yet, if the essence of contract is the ability to rely for future
planning on the expectation of the other party's performance, then anything
that destroys that expectation in a reasonable person should activate a right to
take any action, including cover, deemed necessary or desirable to restore the
expectation. Indeed, in view of the lead time needed to secure many goods, and
in view of the difference often existing between spot prices and prices for future
delivery, savings could be effected by early cover. Another point not enunciated
by the courts is the natural desire of every businessman to keep the amount
147. Id. at 200, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1576 (Lowe, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 201, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1577.
149. The conflict exists in that the installer would not want the extensive expertise of the
manufacturer concentrated on defective installation or modification by the intermediate seller, and
so the notice might not be forwarded upstream.
150. Where the producer or manufacturer is named on the product, the rationale often stated for
holding that no notice need be given, namely, that the producer or manufacturer is not known to the
injured party, becomes inapplicable where the injured party is a remote buyer, but not inapplicable
to an injured bystander beneficiary.
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subject to the risks of litigation to the minimum. Hence, in many instances the
selection of remedy and the timing of its exercise can be left to the discretion of
the merchant. Similarly, some deference might be given to a merchant's decision
that the expectation of future performance had been destroyed. Yet U.C.C.
section 2-160 gives no indication of any change in what will trigger the right to
exercise remedies. The word "repudiation" is used without definitional assistance, except as found in U.C.C. section 2-609( l)'s first sentence stating, "A
contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation
of receiving due performance will not be impaired." But using this sentence in
U.C.C. section 2-609 has not persuaded the courts to adopt it as a definition of
repudiation for U.C.C. section 2-610. 151
Although intended as a means of avoiding the reluctance of the courts to take
a commercial view of repudiation, U.C.C. section 2-609 is not structured to be
that helpful. Yet the comment to U.C.C. section 2-610 seems to treat insecurity
as an entirely separate problem from anticipatory repudiation. U.C.C. section
2-609 revels in loose terms, starting with "reasonable grounds for insecurity,"
"adequate assurances," and a right pending receipt of demanded assurances to
suspend performance "if commercially reasonable," all to be determined by
"commercial standards." After sending the demand for assurances, the sender
must await "a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days" before a failure to
provide will constitute a repudiation. Even then it is only a repudiation if there
was a justified demand.
Yet courts, as in UMIC Government Securities Inc. v. Pioneer Mortgage
Co. 152 and Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Public Utilities, 153 by ruling that the
appropriate remedy was not to claim anticipatory repudiation but to move by
way of U.C.C. section 2-609, seem to treat that section as a necessary way
station on the way to U.C.C. section 2-610. This approach can be taken too far.
Where the action or communication relied on to create an insecurity is one that
could be dispelled by a brief discussion or investigation and this has not been
done, it should be ruled that no reasonable ground for insecurity existed. In In
re Coast Trading Co., 154 there was a fear that one supplier would not honor the
seller's order to ship to the buyer. Since the seller had other suppliers who could
deliver the goods, the fear about one supplier was held not to be a reasonable
ground for insecurity. Alternatively, the court said that buyer had been given
assurances and had not objected to them as inadequate until seller, in reorganization, had filed an application for' authority to assume the contract. Equally,
151. The statement in U.C.C. § 2-610 comment I ( 1978) that weighs against using § 2-609's
first sentence as a definition is the one that says "anticipatory repudiation centers upon an overt
communication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible or demonstrates a
clear determination not to continue with performance." This is a return to the pre-Code common
law formulation with its emphasis on "impossibility" and the "clearness" of the determination not
to perform.
152. 707 F.2d 251, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 149 (6th Cir. 1983).
153. 682 F.2d 883, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 166 (10th Cir. 1982).
154. 26 Bankr. 737, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1180 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); see also Ross
Cattle Co. v. Lewis, 415 So. 2d 1030, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 913 (Miss. 1982).
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when claimed as an excuse for nonperformance, U.C.C. section 2-609 does not
suspend the obligation to perform when there was no prior written demand for
assurances and no contractual agreement for a security interest. 155
The facts in UMIC 156 presented a situation very similar to the example
mentioned in the third paragraph of comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-609 of a
buyer's falling behind in his payments "even though the items involved have to
do with separate and distinct contracts." The purpose of requiring a request for
further assurances is that there can be an explanation for the conduct that is
inconsistent with a refusal to perform the contract. Taking a legal position, even
though questionable about the proper interpretation of a termination clause, as
in Bill's Coal, 157 is an assertion of a right. It is not a manifestation of
nonperforming intent; although if acted upon and later it were determined that
the interpretation was incorrect, there would be a breach.
A narrow point under Mississippi law was at issue before the Fifth Circuit in
Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Brown; 158 it divided the three-judge panel. There were
two contracts by growers to deliver soy beans. Poor weather conditions drastically reduced the crop, and buyer sued. On appeal the defendants conceded that
the poor weather conditions did not excuse their performance. The contracts
were at an average price of $7.28 per bushel for an aggregate of 30,000 bushels.
On December 8, 1980, with delivery scheduled for December 12th, there was a
telephone conversation in which both parties were aware that the growers were
over 20,000 bushels short. On that same day plaintiff purchased, as cover,
20,000 bushels at $8.34~ per bushel. The next day, the balance of the shortage
was covered at $7.84 per bushel. The buyer, therefore, claimed damages of
$21 ,656.00 plus interest.
The issue apparently was whether the defendant repudiated in the December
8th conversation. It was clear in that conversation that defendants did not have
the beans to deliver. One can suppose the issue was whether, to constitute a
repudiation, the defendants had to indicate that they would not buy beans in
place of the lost crop. There were two versions of the conversation given at the
trial, the defendants' being that there was to be a meeting to determine how the
discrepancy would be settled.
One suspects the real battle, not faced by the majority of the panel, was over
who was to purchase the cover. A bit of arithmetic indicates that 20,000 bushels
purchased at $8.34~, or at $1.06~ above the contract price, account for $21,300
of the damages, so that only 635 bushels were purchased at $7.84 the next day.
If defendants had purchased all 20,635 bushels at $7.84 per bushel, the cost of
performing the contract would have been only $11 ,555.60 or a saving of
$10, 100.40 in damages and, of course, the interest would have been just over
half of what it was. The opinion does not disclose whether the market continued
155.
U.C.C.
156.
157.
158.

Automated Energy Sys., Inc. v. Fibers & Fabrics of Georgia, Inc., 298 S.E.2d 328, 35
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
707 F.2d 251, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 145 (6th Cir. 1983).
682 F.2d 883, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 166 (10th Cir. 1982).
709 F.2d 898, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 522 (5th Cir. 1983).
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to drop so that there was, on December 12th, no difference in the market price,
or whether purchases could have been made at less than the market. One can
suspect the latter as defendant at trial, in testimony quoted by the court, stated
that the purpose of the subsequent discussion was "'[w)e were going to get
together and either pay him or him pay us what the difference was on our
contracts that we were short on.' " 159
The latter suggestion seems supported by the fact that the jury found for the
defendants. The trial court sustained a motion for judgment for $21,656 plus
interest notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate court treated the issue as
being whether there was any evidence to support the implicit jury finding that
there was no repudiation in the telephone conversation and so no breach on the
day fixed for the performance. The majority discussed the evidence and joined
with the trial judge in treating the telephone conversation as clearly indicating
no delivery when due, and only a desire for a financial discussion. The
dissenting judge's opinion was that even if the defendant had given two versions
of the telephone conversation in testimony, the jury verdict based on believing
one version could not be reversed.
But from a commercial view was not the real issue, when the growers came
up short, whether the merchant-buyer or the seller-grower could most efficiently effect cover with respect to the buyer's resale needs? The Code offers the
aggrieved party great flexibility. It can await performance by the repudiating
party for a commercially reasonable time, or it can use any and all breach
remedies even if it has notified the repudiating party that it would await
performance and has urged retraction. It can also suspend its own performance.
But this very flexibility is based on the underlying realization that its own best
interests will cause the aggrieved party to take the course of action it believes
will le~ve the least amount of dollars to the risk of litigation. That decision,
when made, should not be the victim of judicial twenty-twenty hindsight. 160 But
before taking such a stance, it should be established that there has been a
repudiation. Is not this a question of fact?
Wahnschaff Corp. v. O.E. Clark Paper Box Co, 161 however, illustrates that a
failure to act after an anticipatory repudiation, if one was made, can lose an
aggrieved party the benefits of claiming a right to suspend performance. The
machines ordered by the buyer were to be delivered within five to six months
from the placing of a firm order. The buyer had not received the machines some
twenty-five months after the order was placed and nineteen months after buyer
tendered the completed down payment. The buyer had attempted to cancel nine
months after placing the order, but the manufacturer said it could not cancel.
One year later, the buyer asked for adequate assurances, but even after that the
parties proceeded as if no such request had been made. Finally the buyer sued
159. Id. at 903, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 529.
160. At least one member of the Committee feels the dissent in Louis Dreyfus Corp. has the
better position and that a repudiation must be by an unequivocal act indicating a lack of intention to
perform or by an improper response, or no response to a U.C.C. § 2-609 demand for assurances.
161. 304 S.E.2d 91, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1186 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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for return of the purchase price, or damages for non-delivery. The seller
defended on the ground that the buyer's attempt to cancel was an anticipatory
repudiation suspending the seller's obligation to perform. The court ruled that
the lengthy intervening period of inaction by either party was equivalent to a
U.C.C. section 2-611 retraction of the repudiation and rejected the seller's
defense, affirming a money judgment for the buyer except for a sum of $3,622
allowed as litigation expense. This amount was ordered stricken from the
judgment.
No annual survey would be complete without reference to at least one case
involving either a buyer's or a seller's attempt to avoid an unexpectedly
burdensome defense by claiming impracticality under U.C.C. section 2-615.
Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. 162 was such a case involving a contract
for the sale of fixed quantities of steel at fixed prices. The prices and quantities
were to be effective for the calendar year 1973. In early 1973, due to rawmaterial shortages and increased demand, the seller indicated to its buyers that
it would sell no more steel except at modified prices. The buyers were unable to
replace the seller's supply and agreed to modifications. Nevertheless, in an effort
to reduce its backlog of orders, pursuant to an internal policy, the seller refused
several purchase orders issued by the buyer in October and December 1973. 163
In 197 4, the parties proceeded on an order-by-order basis, but again the seller
breached several contracts by late deliveries or failure to deliver.
Plaintiff Roth sued for damages and was awarded $555,968.46 on the theory
that Sharon had not acted in good faith in obtaining the modification! Plaintiff
was denied prejudgment interest. Sharon's counterclaim for the price of certain
rejected steel was dismissed.
The seller's first line of defense was that it properly increased prices because
the parties had modified their original contract to reflect changed market
conditions. But the proof showed that the seller had adamantly refused any
performance in the absence of an increase. The court adopted a two-pronged
test as to the validity of the modification. First, the issue was whether the
parties' conduct was consistent with "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade," and second, whether the parties were, in fact, motivated
by an honest desire to compensate for commercial exigencies. The finding of a
lack of honesty on Sharon's part was based on its refusal to sell any steel at all to
plaintiff if it refused to agree to the increased prices. Sharon's argument that it
was justified in its stand by reason of certain provisions in correspondence
between the parties was rejected because the theory was not evident in any of
Sharon's pretrial actions. Thus, the trial court's finding of bad faith could not be
reversed as clearly erroneous. 164

162. 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1435 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. The seller had instituted a policy called "blanking." It would refuse to accept all orders for
delivery in certain "blanked" months, using the production of those months to fill overdue
shipments.
164. 705 F.2d at 148, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1456.
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The court next dealt with the seller's defense of commercial impracticality.
The seller argued that an unforeseeable raw-material shortage occurred; but the
court ruled that with knowledge of the shortage, Sharon continued to accept an
unprecedented amount of orders. Hence, the impracticality was caused not by
the shortage, but by Sharon's acceptance of orders when it knew the shortage
would prevent the filling of the orders.
Impracticality was also offered as an excuse for the seller's failure to deliver
as agreed in 197 4. Once again the seller's conduct negated the defense. Since
performance was only partially impractical, under U.C.C. section 2-615(b) the
seller was required to devise a "fair and reasonable" system of allocation. A
system of allocation was established in 1973, but in February or March 1974,
Sharon began diverting steel to a wholly owned subsidiary warehouse "for the
purpose of avoiding price control." 165 But Sharon failed to show that the
subsidiary was a regular customer or otherwise within the class of permissible
participants when the allocation system was established. Hence, unwaived
delays in delivery constituted unexcused breaches of contract.
One concluding observation may be made. The court apparently limited
participants in the allocation to those that were active customers when the
system was established. But as long as the allocation systems are fair, is there
anything in the Code that precludes a change in allocation systems and the
establishment of a quota for a new entrant if its requirements can be properly
estimated and then proportionately reduced? Or is it the policy of the Code that
in times of shortage new customers may not be accepted? 166

REMEDIES
Any discussion of remedies for breach of a contract of sale, from an efficiency
point of view, must divide the seller's remedies into two classes, goods-oriented
and money-oriented. Goods-oriented remedies, if successful, result in the seller
gaining a return of its goods unless to do so runs afoul of the Bankruptcy Act,
the buyer having gone bankrupt. Money-oriented remedies result in a money
judgment with an ensuing hassle of collecting the judgment from a recalcitrant
or financially troubled debtor. Choosing between a goods-oriented remedy or a
money-oriented remedy is one place where the business person appears to
abandon the usual war cry of "Go for the money!" Goods-oriented remedies are
thought to yield money sooner and in greater quantity when the seller controls
the realization sale.
Two goods-oriented sellers' remedies are found in the Code. U.C.C. section
2-507(2) states what is left of the old cash sale doctrine, rather laconically
stating that the buyer's "right as against the seller to retain or dispose of [the

165. Id. at 151, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1460.
166. A further question is whether, should a customer with an allocation cease being a customer,
the allocation can be shifted to an entirely new customer.
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goods] ... is conditional upon his making the payment due." 167 The good news
is that the section docs not require that the buyer be insolvent. The bad news is
that no procedure for recovery or time limit for demand is fixed in the text of the
statute. Comment No. 3 to U.C.C. section 2-507, however, attempts to fill the
gap by stating that the words "right as against the seller" are "words of
limitation to conform with the policy set forth in the bona fide purchase sections
of this Article." The comment then concludes, "The provision of this Article for
a ten day limit within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to
an insolvent buyer is also applicable here,'' when, in fact, the referenced section,
U.C.C. section 2-702, requires only a demand in that time.
This last bit of legislation by comment was too much for the California Court
of Appeals in Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 168 a case involving the
conflicting claims of a cash seller and a bank as lien creditor on a defaulted loan.
The car was sold on May 20, 1982, for a cash price paid by a check which
bounced after the buyer had received the vehicle and a certificate of ownership.
When the bank received its judgment it caused the sheriff to levy on the
purchased automobile in early September 1982. On September 10, 1982, the car
seller filed a third-party claim. The court noted that the First and Fifth Circuits
had adopted the ten-clay rule 169 on the premise that the ten-day rule provided a
more certain guide than the common law yardstick of reasonableness. The
California court preferred the approach of the Eighth Circuit and several legal
writers that text controlled the comment. 170 The court was impressed by the
suggestion that many cash sellers would not learn of a dishonored check until
the ten days from delivery had lapsed. How accurate this conclusion is in view
of the present speedup in local check collections, and how often sellers take outof-town uncertified checks, were not discussed.
Having decided that the last sentence of the comment did not control the text,
the court, without mentioning the comment, gave the reclaiming cash seller
priority over the lien creditor under U.C.C. section 2-403 and the pre-Code
common law. The trial court's finding for the seller required the appellate court
to "presume the court below determined the seller had acted within a reasonable
time." Again without any factual foundation of business practices, the court
asserted, as other courts and writers have, that the ten-day rule would cause
cash sellers to act like credit sellers, that is, to accept only certified checks or
insist upon security interests. Apparently it was felt that the judgment-lien
creditor, over whom the reclaiming seller has priority if acting within a
167. See U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1978) (stating that as between the parties payment "is defeated ...
by dishonor of the check on due presentment").
168. 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
169. Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 737 (1st Cir.
1980); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 545 (5th Cir.
1976).
170. Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1489 (8th Cir. 1980);
J. White & R. Summers, supra note 129, at 115; Dugan, Cash Sale Seller Under Articles 2 and 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 330 (1976); Note, The Rights of Reclaiming Cash
Sellers When Contested by Secured Creditors of the Buyer, 77 Col um. L. Rev. 934 ( 1977).
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reasonable time, presents a greater danger than the bona fide purchaser, a term
including a secured party 171 who obtains immediate priority. That latter priority
does not seem to have triggered the feared reaction from the cash sellers, but we,
too, have no factual foundation for such a conclusion.
Bankruptcy cases involving a seller's right of reclamation, usually under
U.C.C. section 2-702, show no sign of abating. In an insolvency context, one
issue that has been frequently litigated is whether Congress intended section
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to be the exclusive remedy for reclaiming sellers.
In Ecolotec, Inc. v. Deephouse Equipment Co., 172 a seller, claiming an express
fraudulent representation, sought to have a constructive trust imposed upon
identifiable proceeds of goods sold to the bankrupt. The alleged fraudulent
representation was that Deephouse had not yet received payment for the sale of
a Vacu-sweeper to Danbury and that payment was imminent. The seller did
not allege a demand for reclamation within ten days. The case was before the
court on a motion to dismiss seller's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The seller's theory was that property obtained by fraud did not become
part of the debtor's estate. The court ruled that whether a seller relies on
U.C.C. section 2-702 or a common law theory, compliance with the ten-day
requirement in section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code is a pre-condition to any
reclamation. The court implies, in the course of its opinion, that under no
circumstances would a seller be permitted to recover the proceeds of sold goods.
This holding would now preclude rescission for common law fraud under
U.C.C. section 2-721 if the breaching party was in reorganization.
Another goods-oriented remedy of a seller is seller's right of stoppage in
transit. Reclamation from a bankrupt buyer is possible if the seller can satisfy
the requirements of section 546( c). But the seller would much prefer, if the
buyer is insolvent, that the buyer never receive the goods. The seller, if possible,
could use U.C.C. section 2-705, which permits a seller to stop delivery of goods
in the possession of a carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be
insolvent. At issue in National Sugar Refining Co. v. C. Czarnikow, lnc. 173 was
whether, when title had passed to the buyer, the seller's exercise of its right of
stoppage after the buyer's bankruptcy was subject to objection of any one of
three grounds. First, did it constitute a "statutory lien" under section 545 of the
Bankruptcy Code? Second, did it result in the creation of an interest in seller's
favor subordinate to the rights of the debtor in possession under section 544(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code? Third, was the stoppage a violation of the automatic
stay provisions of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code?
In the court's view, the right of stoppage was not impaired by the buyer's
bankruptcy on any of the three theories. In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied principally on section 546( c). It wrote:

171. U.C.C. § 1-201(33) and (32) (1978).
172. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 147 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
173. 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 821 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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In the light of this provision's denial of the avoidance powers conferred
on a trustee under Bankruptcy Code §§ 544(a) and 545 as against a seller
who delivers goods and then reclaims, we find it hardly likely that Congress intended to grant these very same powers as against a seller who
succeeds in "reclaiming" the goods prior to delivery, by means of stopping
them in transit. 174
The court disposed of the argument that seller's stoppage violated the automatic
stay by stating:
As a practical matter, establishing as a prerequisite to such exercise an
application for relief would in many instances effectively deny to the seller
the right of stoppage, in light of the often short period between the filing of
the petition and actual or constructive delivery of the goods during which
the right must be exercised. Stoppage in transit, as opposed to any disposition of the goods so stopped should be viewed as analogous to the written
demand required of a reclaiming seller under Code§ 546(c). 175
High interest rates in the money market have had an impact on monetary
damage awards, as it is felt that statutory interest at the judgment rate does not
always place the seller in the position it would have been in had the buyer
performed. 176 Thus, in Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 177 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with the breakdown of a
$4 million sale of fuel oil. Sun, the buyer, accepted the oil but refused to pay.
Bulk won a summary judgment for the contract price in which the question of
incidental damages was left for further consideration. In order to perform the
contract, Bulk had borrowed "almost all of the cost from Chase Manhattan
Bank." 178 Upon its further consideration, the district court awarded Bulk, as
incidental damages, the amount of the post-breach interest payments to Chase
and then awarded interest at the statutory rate on both the incidental damages
and the full contract price. Sun appealed on the ground that statutory interest
was all the compensation for the use of money to which Bulk was entitled. Not
so, replied the court. The New York Court of Appeals had allowed, in a
U.C.C. section 2-708 case, "finance charges incurred as incidental damages."
The fact that this suit was under U.C.C. section 2-709 made no difference. The
New York Court of Appeals had mentioned that the comment to U.C.C. section
2-710 has stated that the section intends to allow "all commercially reasonable
expenditures made by the seller." 179 Thus the listing in U.C.C. section 2-710 of
"any commercially reasonable [costs] incurred in stopping delivery, in the
174. Id. at 828.
175. Id. at 831-32.
176. Placing the aggrieved party in this position is the thrust of U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978).
177. 697 F.2d 481, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 23 (2d Cir. 1983).
178. Id. at 482, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 24.
179. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 950 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972). Accord under U.C.C. § 2-706(1). lntermeat, Inc. v.
American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925 (2d Cir. 1978).
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transportation, care and custody of the goods, after the buyer's breach, ... "was
not intended to be an exclusive listing. 180
When it came to the award of statutory interest, however, the court affirmed
the award of statutory interest on the post-breach interest payments, but
reversed as to statutory interest also on that portion of the purchase price
covered by the principal amount of the Chase Bank loan, as this would be a
double recovery for the loss of use of money. The interest award on the excess of
price over the loan was affirmed.
In Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 181 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine allowed a recovery of floor-plan interest, but no recovery at the floorplan rate for the period after the plaintiff paid off the loan. However, the
judgment did include a statutory interest amount. 182
These cases show a growing realization that statutory or judgment rates of
interest do not compensate unpaid sellers for lost opportunity costs occasioned
by a failure to pay money. At times of low market interest rates, a fixed
statutory rate will overcompensate and at times of high money costs a fixed
statutory rate undercompensates. Further, as studies of the problems by our
Canadian neighbors 183 have indicated, any attempts to tie the so-called judgment
rate to a market rate would not be appropriate. A market rate is largely
composed of two elements. One is ihe "real interest rate," or cost of money. The
other is compensation for erosion of money values caused by the lender's
anticipation of future inflation. Thus the formula for a variable statutory rate,
according to the studies, should take account of the actual erosion of inflation
over the period of nonpayment, plus the real interest rate for the period. When,
as in Bulk Oil, there is an actual unpaid loan, the compensation for delay in
payment of the principal sum should be limited to the actual interest paid.
Fixed statutory rates also have the disadvantage that changes are subject to
legislative priorities and time tables. They are thus unresponsive to actual
market variations.
The Schiavi case is also interesting for two other points. The first is that the
court found that the duty to mitigate damages, although not explicit in the Code,
survived the enactment of the Code under U.C.C. section 1-103 and could be
implied from the Code's broad principles of good faith and fair dealing. This
result, the court said, comported with the statement in comment 1 to U.C.C.
section 1-106 that "damages must be minimized." The principle was applicable
in Schiavi, because buyer-defendant's father had said in September that he
would buy the mobile home from the purchaser if his son could not. The seller's
180. Accord Metropolitan Transfer Station, Inc. v. Design Structures, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 532
(Iowa Ct. App. 1982), applying rule by analogy to the defective structure of a garbage transfer
station.
181. 463 A.2d 722, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190 (Me. 1983).
182. In footnote 1 the court said the lower court awarded $500 in interest, costs and attorney's
fees.
183. See Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on Prejudgment Compensation on Money
Awards (Jan. 4, 1982, Rept. No. 47) at 34-60.
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unreasonable failure to pursue this solution violated the duty to mitigate
damages and precluded any recovery for losses accruing thereafter.
The second point was that the plaintiff had not proved a case for recovery as a
lost-volume seller by its sale, two months after the conversation with the father,
at a price $1,028.69 less than the father had offered. A sale to the father clearly
could be made only to cover the son's default. Hence, such a sale would not have
supported a lost-profits, lost-volume seller recovery. 184
A section of some interest to buyers is U.C.C. section 2-711(3 ). It is one of the
few goods-oriented remedies for buyers. A buyer who rightfully rejects a tender
is given a security interest in goods in its possession or control to secure the
repayment of payments made and expenses incurred in the handling of the
goods. As a secured party, the buyer is entitled to resell the goods and recover
from the proceeds the difference between the resale price and the amount of the
secured debt. In a case reminiscent of some decisions involving a secured party's
disposition of collateral under article 9, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that a buyer's resale that did not comply with the terms of U.C.C. section 2-706
precluded the buyer from recovering the balance owned by the seller. In Deaton,
Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 185 the facts showed: the sale occurred nearly two years
after the rejection during which time, due to outdoor storage, the goods deteriorated; the buyer failed to give the seller notice of the sale; the buyer rejected the
seller's refund offer of $21,736.39, and then resold for $9,200; and the buyer
apparently sought no other bids before accepting the low sales price two years
after refusing seller's refund offer. One justification offered for the article 9 rule
of no deficiency judgment is that the secured party considered the collateral to be
worth more than the Joan or the loan would not have been made. (There are
three prevailing rules governing the position of a secured party after a nonconforming sale.) 186 But the situation of a selling buyer is different. The goods were
rejected because they were nonconforming. In the case before the court, the
finding of the trial court was one of substantial impairment. 187 Hence, there was
no previous value of the actual goods delivered by the seller. On the other hand,
the recovery of any deficiency by the buyer, under the express provisions of
U.C.C. section 2-706, is subject to the clause "[w)here the resale is made in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the [buyer) may recover
the difference ... "; whereas U.C.C. section 9-507 speaks of recovery by the
debtor of a loss caused by the failure to make a commercially reasonable sale. A
buyer retaining rejected goods is not restricted to the remedy of resale. The
buyer can elect to sue for the difference between the amount of the market value
184. The Schiavi case, al n.6, gives a good listing of lost-volume cases and of the li1erature
thereon.
185. 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130 (N.M. 1982).
186. They are: no deficiency judgment allowed; collateral is presumed worth the debt, but
secured party can prove fair market value was less; and buyer must prove damages caused by lack of
commercially reasonable sale.
187. The New Mexico Supreme Court pointed out that proof of a substantial impairment was
not required under a rejection, only for a revocation of acceptance. 657 P.2d at 113, 35 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. at 136.
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of the goods accepted and the value they would have if they had been as
warranted under U.C.C. section 2-714 or, after a rejection, may recover
damages for nondelivery. As specifically stated, the buyer is entitled to recover
as much of the price as has been j:>aid, 188 with an adjustment for the seller's
damages from any improper sale. But no evidence of values was introduced by
plaintiff in the Deaton case; hence, there was no basis for any recovery.
The other buyer goods-oriented remedies of specific performance, replevin
under U.C.C. section 2-716, and the right to goods on seller's insolvency,
spawned no significant cases 189 since the last annual survey.
In Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 190 the buyer of a new Buick in the Bronx
lost three vacation days when forced to await the arrival of necessary parts after
a breakdown in Nova Scotia. Plaintiff sued for emotional harm. The court had
to decide whether any recovery was possible in view of the exclusion of
"payment" for loss of use of the car during warranty repairs. The warranty
provided that the exclusion included "lodging bills, car rentals, other travel costs
or loss of pay." But the warranty exclusion was headed "WHAT IS NOT
COVERED" and the quoted language was in an item designated "EXTRA
EXPENSES."
The court granted recovery under a three-stage reasoning process. The court
considered first whether damages for emotional harm can be recovered in a
contract action under the usual foreseeability test. It concluded that such
damages were foreseeable, relying on the nature of the automobile and the
warranty booklet's provision that warranty service was offered by any Buick
dealer and that in case of breakdown one should go to the nearest Buick dealer.
The court concluded "We live only in time, time lost is irreplaceable." 191 The
judge, in the second stage, applied the rule of contra proferentem and determined that consequential damages had not been excluded by any general
provision and that only expenses, not damages for emotional harm, were
expressly excluded. Third, he considered whether contract law itself excluded
this type of damages. Noting that usually "damages for emotional injury are not
recoverable in a breach of contract action unless a separate tort has accompanied
the breach," 192 the court considered that the lack of any remedy for the plaintiff
and a public policy in favor of some form of damages to serve as an incentive for
prompt warranty service, supported a recovery. The plaintiff was, therefore,
given a $200 judgment.
188. Royea, Inc. v. Cattengim, 427 So. 2d 759, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 465 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (no need to prove no adequate remedy at law under the Code for rescission).
189. Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Marketing, Inc., 29 Bankr. 523, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 475 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (buyer not in possession of partially paid for Varba
airplane, even if buyer in ordinary course, must establish a goods oriented remedy. Here seller not
insolvent until more than 10 days after payment; no uniqueness or other special circumstances and
no showing of inability to cover).
190. 459 N.Y.S.2d 679, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 466 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
191. Id. at 680, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 468.
192. Id. at 681, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 470.
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One issue which continues to reappear, and upon which courts have disagreed, is what effect is to be given to a consequential damages disclaimer if it is
determined that an exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose. U.C.C.
section 2-719(2) provides that in such a case "remedy may be had as provided in
this Act." Does that mean that a buyer is then entitled to recover consequential
damages pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-715? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, joining a majority of the decisions, has answered the question,
under the law of the State of Washington, in the negative. 193 The court did not
rule solely on the case count but considered the comments and applied principles
of statutory construction to hold that to recover consequential damages in an
action between merchants the plaintiff must prove that the provision was
unconscionable. U.C.C. section 2-719(3) exclusively controlled the enforceability of the exclusion of consequential damages, overriding any implication from
U.C.C. section 2-719(2).
Two other cases are worthy of note. One is Maxfield v. Simmons. 194 The
issue involved was whether the four-year statute of limitations contained in
U.C.C. section 2-725 was applicable where a builder of a house, constructed
with defective trusses, sought indemnity from the supplier and manufacturer of
the trusses after the statute had run. In a poorly reasoned opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court correctly recognized that U.C.C. section 2-725 "controls in
causes of action based on contract principles but not in those causes of action
based on tort principles," 195 but then stated that the contract statute has no
application to the indemnity cause of action. 196 Why? Because, said the court,
although the obligation to indemnify arose from the contractual relationship
between the parties, the cause of action is nevertheless grounded in tort. The
effect of the case, therefore, is to preserve to an assembler sued in tort after the
four-year statute had run as to the supplier's contract, the right to obtain
indemnity or reimbursement from his suppliers. The result, as the court said,
was to make the rule similar to its previous decision in products liability law
where the assembler of a product is sued and seeks indemnity from the
manufacturer of the component part. 197
It almost seems that a plaintiff can have the benefit of whichever statute of
limitations will prevent the suit from being barred. Williams v. West Penn
Power Co. 198 involved a suit brought more than two years after the injury
occurred but less than four years after the purchase of the defective product,
namely, scaffolding equipment. The injury occurred on the date of the first use,
and personal injuries were suffered by the purchaser and by his employee. The
193.
U.C.C.
194.
195.
196.
197.
(1975).
198.

Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427, 36
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 170 (6th Cir. 1983).
_ _ N.E.2d - - , 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 553 (III. 1983).
Id. 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 556.
Id. 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 556.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857
467 A.2d 811(Pa.1983).
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superior court, by a divided panel, had given the purchaser's claim for personal
injuries the benefit of the four-year statute, but held that the employee's claim
was barred by the two-year statute. 199 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed as to the employee, holding that he, too, was entitled to the benefit of the
four-year statute. Noting that Pennsylvania had adopted alternative A of
U.C.C. section 2-318 so that statutory third-party beneficiaries were limited to
members of the purchaser's household, Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix went to
the comment to find that the statute was "neutral" 200 about the doctrine of
privity and did not, therefore, preclude a court from demolishing any remaining
vestige of the citadel. 201 The court stated that, in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff now
has the option of suing in tort until the tort statute has run or suing in contract
for breach of warranty if it has run but the four-year statute has not run. The
court did not need to address the prompt notice requirement for breach of
warranty discussed above. 202
The cases illustrate the need to eliminate differences between causes of action
in contract and those in tort which arise out of identical transactions, a problem
now being discussed abroad, 203 and as also illustrated by the House of Lords
decision this year in junior Books Ltd. u. Veitch{ & Co., 204 where economic loss
was recovered in a tort case.
The subject of cover under U.C.C. section 2-712 has spawned a few interesting decisions. In McGinnis u. Wentworth Chevrolet Co. 205 the Supreme Court of
Oregon said that the cover remedy was not intended to apply beyond "those
situations where the buyer has purchased or contracted to purchase goods as an
actual replacement for" the agreed performance. Hence, the conditions of
U.C.C. section 2-712 did not govern a suit for the return of the purchase price
and incidental and consequential damages. Under that latter holding the court
permitted recovery of the rental costs of a substitute vehicle, 206 but not under the
concept of cover. Cover includes, under U.C.C. section 2-712(1 ), "any reason199. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., _ _ Pa. Super. _ _ , 460 A.2d 278 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983).
200. Comment 3, before its change by the 1966 Amendments to the Code, read
This Section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household and
guests of the purchaser. Beyond this the Section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
The Williams opinion does not limit the neutrality to vertical privily, but extends it to horizontal
privily. 467 A.2d at 817-18.
201. The court notes that at least 16 states have enacted "Products Liability Statutes" with their
own statutes of repose. Id. at 817 n. 18.
202. See sujJra text accompanying note 140.
203. Holyoak, 7'1rt and Cor1tract after junior Books, 99 L.Q. Rev. 591 (1983).
204. 1983 A.C. 520.
205. 645 P.2d 543, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1315 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
206. See sufna text accompanying notes 5 and 193 for discussions of whether circumstances
causing an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose (UCC § 2-719(2)) also cancel
a limitation or exclusion of consequential damages.
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able purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from
the seller." The court looked at the definition of "purchase" in U.C.C. section
1-201(32) and found no mention of leasing or rental.
In the case of an anticipatory repudiation, an aggrieved buyer has a choice
between cover under U.C.C. section 2-712 and the cost-or-market formula of
U.C.C. section 2-713. Having chosen to cover, an aggrieved buyer should not be
able to elect the cost-or-market formula just because it would yield greater
damages than the below-market cover contract. 207
In another anticipatory repudiation case, the buyer sought to include damages
caused by the delayed arrival of the substitute goods at the construction site as
added costs of cover. But just as a seller may not include overhead in the cost of
a seller's resale, the court in In re john Gruss, Co. 208 refused to include "Field
Overhead for 19 additional days" as a recoverable element. It did allow
"Additional supervisory labor to reschedule laborers" and "Additional administrative costs to reschedule laborers," totaling $5,753.68. The court did not allow
"Field Overhead for 19 additional days" in the amount of over $30,000, but
only for the reason that it had not been demonstrated that the delayed delivery
of the duct-work had delayed the completion of the buyer's entire contract by
nineteen days.
The effect of delays not solely caused by a seller's breach was handled in a
different way in Fabrica ltaliana Lavorazione Materie Organich 'e S.A.S. v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation. 209 The case involved a contract to
sell a commodity called DAP, F.O.B. Tampa, Florida. Kaiser was to ship from
Tampa, by a vessel to be nominated by plaintiff, with sufficient lead time before
shipment in December 1979. In November plaintiff nominated the Soviet ship
Belovodsk, but later learned that due to problems in Cuba, the Belovodsk could
not arrive in Tampa before December 31. Thereupon plaintiff nominated a
substitute Soviet vessel, the Uelen, scheduled to arrive in Tampa on December
29, 1979. Since there was a ten-day lag between arrival and berthing, Kaiser
Aluminum, on December 28, 1979, cancelled the contract. This it was not
entitled to do, as the nomination had occurred with adequate lead time, and so
the cancellation constituted a repudiation.
The plaintiff immediately purchased cover for loading on the Uelen, but by
the time the vessel, which arrived in the harbor as scheduled, reached the
loading berth the International Longshoreman's Association had instituted a
boycott of Soviet ships and refused to load the Uelen. After obtaining a nonSoviet ship to carry the DAP, the plaintiff sued for breach and the cost of cover.
Kaiser's defense that had it not repudiated, it would not have been able to load
the Uelen anyway was not successful. At the time of breach, December 28,
1979, the boycott was not in effect, and plaintiff was entitled to cover.
The more violent and rapid the market fluctuations in commodity prices, the
greater is the need for some control over the recovery by a buyer, as shown in
207. See infra text accompanying notes 210-12.
208. 22 Bankr. 236, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1192 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
209. 684 F.2d 776, 3,4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1193 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Milwaukee Valve Co. v. Mishawaka Brass Manufacturing, /nc. 210 Here, while
the original purchase was for materials for certain contracts, the buyer diverted
deliveries ordered for other contracts to perform those certain contracts, and
some months after the date for performance replenished the resultant depletion
of inventory as cover. 211 Recovery of the cover price was allowed. The difference
between the recovery on the market-price formula and the actual cost of
postperformance replenishment of inventory should not be considered an overcompensation to the buyer. The option to choose between the cost of cover, if
made, and the contract-market-price formula, should be fully preserved as to all
preperformance-date covers even if higher than the market price at date of
performance. The lead time for deliveries justifies this. It is a different issue
whether option should remain after the date for performance has passed and it
can be shown that cover could readily have been obtained at a lower price
within a reasonable time after the buyer learned of the breach. 212

BULK TRANSFERS
The major interest in article 6 is the progress of efforts to improve its
operation through redrafting. The scope and progress of that effort has, however, been reported previously in this publication. 213
Three cases of some significance will be discussed. Two involve the problem
of what constitutes sufficient "concealment" to toll the six months from the
transfer date statute of limitations found in U.C.C. section 6-111. Substituted is
the rule that each creditor of the transferor may bring an action or make a levy
within six months after its discovery of the transfer. The cases reach opposite
results. The third case involves the rights of a secured party of the transferor
after a noncomplying transfer, an ensuing bankruptcy, and the appearance of
competing creditors.
In Columbia Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 214 a divided panel of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a failure of the bulk transferee to give
any notice at all to creditors was a concealment. On the other hand, in
Chartered Bank of London v. Diamant, 216 the Ninth Circuit took the opposite
view, but under a repealed provision of the California Code requiring a bulk
sales notice in the case of a security interest. Here a bulk sales notice was
published but was rendered immune from attack by the running of California's
section 6111 one-year statute. California had, after the transfer, by an amend210. 319 N.W.2d 885, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
211. There can be grave evidentiary difficulties for a seller in determining, when sued on a costmarket formula, whether a continually purchasing buyer did, in fact, cover.
212. See the discussions in Sebert, Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 360 (1981); Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadm':1P for
Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199 (1963).
213. See Hawkland, Proposed Revisions to U.C.C. Article 6, 38 Bus. Law 1729 (1983).
214. 461A.2d312, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
215. _ _ F.2d _ _ , 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1415 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ment to its U.C.C., excluded security interests from the scope of article 6 and
the court made much of this.
Both cases recognized a division of authority on the point, with no controlling
prior decision in either California or Pennsylvania. The split of authority is not
very extensive as yet, 216 and so a policy discussion may be useful.
The better policy would, perhaps, be to treat concealment as requiring an
intent that creditors of the transferor should not know of the transfer. A total
failure to comply, with no provision for creditors of the transferor and no
indication of new ownership, should, however, give rise to an inference of
concealment. Concealment should not be found when, as is often the case,
certain debts are assumed by the transferee, the transferor agrees to pay off the
others, a portion of the purchase price is escrowed to secure performance of that
covenant, and there is no lack of general knowledge that there are new owners.
The modern justification for a bulk sales law lies in the recognition that a
species of commercial fraud exists where a merchant converts tangible assets
into intangible wealth which can easily be placed beyond the ability of creditors
to reach with the usual creditor's post-judgment process. It is not really essential
that the creditor disappear, just that the tangible assets transmute into those that
are intangible and concealable. Creditors in such cases might be thought to need
some pre-transfer notice. But the interests of buyers require a short statute of
limitations. The Code extended its six months from the transfer limitation
period, based not on a failure of pre-transfer notice, but on post-transfer
concealment. Hence, some active hiding should be required.
In the third case, National Bank of Texas v. West Texas Wholesale Supply
Co., 217 a Fifth Circuit panel determined the extent of the security interests of
three perfected secured parties where a bulk transfer of a gun shop's assets had
occurred without compliance with article 6 of the Texas U.C.C.
The bulk transferor first created a security interest in all present and afteracquired inventory of the gun shop in favor of National Bank of Texas, which
filed a U.C.C.-1 in a trade name which the panel ruled to be a sufficient
perfection in this case. The subsequent bulk transferee purported to act as a
partner in the enterprise in this transaction. About a year and a quarter later
the bulk transferor, an individual, created a perfected secured interest in all
inventory, proceeds, and accounts receivable and also all equipment, furniture,
and fixtures used in the debtor's place of business.
216. The Ninth Circuit cited Aerolineas Argentinas v. Hansen. & Yorke Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) as containing a dictum that noncompliance did not
alone amount to a concealment and E. J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, 33 A.D.2d 689, 306
N.Y.S.2d 316, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1261 (1969) (requiring a complete failure). 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1420 n.7. The Pennsylvania Superior Court cited these and also Aluminum
Shapes, Inc. v. K-A-Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1194
(W.D. Pa. 1968) (requiring "active" or "affirmative" concealment) and McKissick v. ForemostMcKesson, Inc., 441F.2d811, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 301 (5th Cir. 1971) for a dictum
that failure to give notice is a concealment. 461 A.2d at 314-15, 366 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 925.
217. 714 F.2d 1316, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Two weeks later the proprietor of the gun shop assigned all of his interest to
Cynthia McBee, who had engineered the first secured transaction. In the bulk
sales contract, she agreed to comply with article 6 of the Code but never did so.
Two months and ten days after the bulk transfer, McBee sought and obtained a
loan from Republic Bank, which was also perfected, covering "All accounts,
contract rights ... inventory ... whether now owned or hereafter acquired."
The three perfected security interests each covered after-acquired property
when, three months after the Republic loan, McBee filed in bankruptcy. The
trustee in bankruptcy sold all of the inventory. The issue was over priorities in
the distribution of the sum realized on the sale of the inventory.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (not at issue here) provides that
the creditor of the transferor may pursue the property transferred except as
against a bona fide purchaser, 218 but has no specific provision for attaching
proceeds in the hands of the transferee. Unlike the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, the bulk sales article in U.C.C. section 6-105 makes a
conveyance "ineffective" if the notice is not given. Therefore, in National Bank
of Texas, the court was faced with determining what "ineffective" meant when
applied to a conveyance of inventory, much of which had been sold and replaced
by more recci1tly purchased inventory. Unfortunately for Republic Bank, it did
not have a purchase money security interest.
Rather than limiting the transferor's secured parties to tracing conveyed
inventory, the court limited them only to the value of the transferred property. It
then applied the rule of first to file. 219
In a sense, the court adopted a compromise rule continuing the effect of the
after-acquired property clause as to the property covered, but limiting its scope
to the value of the property subject to the lien at the time of transfer. 220
In its analysis of what was meant by making a noncomplying sale ineffective,
the court implied that compliance and, perhaps, noncompliance with article 6
would subject a secured creditor to U.C.C. section 6-111 's six months' limitation
periods. This would not be the only situation in which secured parties are
required to exercise some degree of diligence as to the collateral for the benefit of
subsequent transferees from the debtor. The four-month rule of U.C.C. section
9-103(1)(d) is but one example. There are also the special rules as to future
advances of U.C.C. section 9-301(4) and U.C.C. section 9-307(3). Further
U.C.C. section 1-201(12) defines "creditor" as including "a general creditor, a

218. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,§ 9, gives the following two remedies to a creditor
whose claim has matured: "(a) Have the conveyance set aside ... to the extent necessary to satisfy
his claim, or (b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed." Section 10 provides that a crtdi,or whose claim has not matured may, in a court of
competent jurisdiction, "(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property, (b) Appoint a
receiver to take charge of the property, (c) Set aside the conveyance ... , or (d) Make any order
which the circumstances of the case may require." Selected Commercial Statutes, 1135 (West 1981 ).
219. u.c.c. § 9-312(5) (1978).
220. Some members of the Committee are of the opinion that the Fifth Circuit panel in Nat'/
Bank of Tex. committed error on every holding in the case.
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secured creditor, a lien creditor" and others. Hence, secured creditors are subject
to article 6's rules covering creditors.
The policy, in cases such as National Bank of Texas, requires that a balance
be struck between the interest of the bulk transferee in freedom from prior
claims and the interest of the secured party in new acquisitions. Historically the
after-acquired property clause referred to property acquired by the debtor, not
property acquired by a transferee, whether by merger or by bulk sale. A
distinction can and should be made between a secured party's property interest
in the thing itself, which is transferred, and the interest, historically an equitable interest, in having the security interest attach to purchases made by one
other than the debtor. The National Bank of Texas court's solution to the
balancing of interests is one as to which reasonable persons may differ.

WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
The annual survey has for some years neglected article 7. While there is
nothing startling in this year's batch of cases, the decisions are not without some
interest. 221

NEGOTIABLE OR NONNEGOTIABLE DOCUMENTS
The alternative holding of the bankruptcy judge in Hodges v. Anderson, 222
that warehouse receipts that apparently provided for delivery to George Kerr,
Inc. "in its name" were negotiable because when endorsed in blank by the
named person they became payable to bearer, will surprise some readers used to
the magic words of "to order or to bearer" in article 3's definition of a negotiable
instrument. The receipts did bear a legend stating: "Under the Statute Laws of
South Carolina, this receipt carries absolute title to the products herein described which will be delivered only upon presentation of this receipt and
payment of all warehouse charges and expenses." 223 The bankruptcy judge's
analysis was that U.C.C. section 2-701(1 )(a) provided that a warehouse receipt
is negotiable "if, by its terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the
order of a named person." 224 He then read the definition of "bearer" in U.C.C.
section 1-201 ( 5) as including a person in possession of a document of title
endorsed ir blank, and buttressed his conclusion by the statement in U.C.C.
section 7-202 in that a warehouse receipt need not be in any particular form.
He concluded

221. See, Henson, Some Problems Involving Documents of Title, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 585 ( 1982),
for some matters not here discussed.
222. 25 Bankr. 2, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981 ), aff'd on other
grounds, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1289 (4th Cir. 1982).
223. Id. at 6, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1284.
224. Id. at 7, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1285.
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The warehouse receipts pledged to First National by the debtor were
negotiable because they represented absolute title to the goods, were issued
to the debtor, were endorsed by the debtor in blank and were delivered to
First N?tional. Since the goods represented by the receipts could be
obtained only upon presentation and surrender of the receipts, the goods
were to be delivered to the bearer of the receipts. The receipts thus meet
the requirements of negotiability. 225

The second paragraph of the comment to U.C.C. section 7-104 states that the
clause requiring surrender is included by many bailees in nonnegotiable documents as a means of insuring a return of the documents. Thus it will come as a
surprise to warehousemen issuing what they think are nonnegotiable receipts
with the clause, that the receipt becomes negotiable when endorsed in blank.
Yet there is a negative implication that can be drawn from U.C.C. section
7-104(2) that will support the bankruptcy judge's conclusion. 226 Subsection (2)
provides that a bill of lading with goods consigned to a named person is not
made negotiable by such a clause. The negative inference is that a warehouse
receipt would be. The comment refers to all bailees. Can a comment overcome a
negative implication from the text?
In affirming the ruling of the bankruptcy judge that First National Bank had
a perfected security interest, the circuit court of appeals discussed only the
alternative ground that the bank had, in fact, perfected a possessory interest by
notice to a bail~e. Unfortunately, as to the negotiability of the warehouse
receipts, the circuit court merely said "we find it unnecessary to reach this issue ... "

FAILURE TO DELIVER AND LIMITATIONS OF
LIABILITY
Contraqual limitations of liability continue to raise issues as to whether the
conduct of the bailee transcends the limits of the protection afforded by U.C.C.
section 7-204 for warehousemen and section 7-309 for carriers. Both sections
permit limi\ations of liability except where the bailee has converted tj"1e bailed
goods to its own use. This exclusion has resulted in litigation over conversion to
the bailee's own use or other causes of the disappearance of goods. As may be
expected, the litigation involves the extent of a plaintiff's required prima facie
case and who has the burden of coming forward with explanatory evidence after
proof of delivery qnd of failure to redeliver. During the period of this survey

225. Id., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1285.
226. U.C.C. § 7-1 OS's rule forbidding construction by negative implication, textually refers only
to parts 2 and 3. Hence, the construction by negative inference is not textually barred as to U.C.C.
§ 7-104. Would a court using the rule of U.C.C. § 1-109, that section captions are a part of the
Code, refuse to apply a negative implication throughout article 7 as the caption is not as limited as
the text? This is very doubtful.
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three courts discussed the issues, 227 usually raised by plaintiffs, relying on a
1980 decision of the New York Court of Appeals in I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v.
Municipal Warehouse Co. 228 In that case, the court held the bailee liable in
conversion where the bailee "suggested" theft as an excuse, but its evidence did
not "make a sufficient showing in support of its suggested explanation of the
loss." 229 The impact of the ruling by the New York Court of Appeals is that a
plaintiff makes a prima facie case for conversion upon showing delivery and no
goods available for return. The burden of coming forward with explanatory
evidence then falls on the bailee, who satisfies that burden by proof of facts
indicating negligent or nonnegligent loss, 230 whereupon the plaintiff bears the
risk of nonpersuasion on its claim of conversion.
In Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc., 231 the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, followed the I.C.C. Metals case, also finding support in pre-Code cases
from Missouri, Arkansas, California, and South Dakota. 232 Plaintiff bailor
proved delivery, demand, and a shortage in the return. Three hundred thirtyseven cases of Chivas Regal Scotch whiskey were stored; only 297 were
available for return. Liability in conversion was sustained against defendant's
suggestion that only a presumption of negligence was shown. Defendant then
proved a negligent misdelivery, which was held to be a conversion.
On the other hand, in Inland Metals Refining Co., 233 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Indiana law, declined to follow
I.C.C. Metals in view of pre-Code Indiana precedent, 234 holding that an unexplained disappearance could give rise to an inference of negligence only. On the
issue of negligence, the bailor asserted an equitable estoppel in that, long before
the request for return was made, the warehouseman had indications of shortage.
But the court held the proof failed to show essential elements of estoppel, that is,
either a duty to disclose or any real knowledge of the disappearance of goods;
227. Inland Metals Ref. Co. v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 344, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 266 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman
Warehouse Co., 458 A.2d 1341, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983); and
Adams v. Ryan & Christie Storage, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 409, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 930
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
228. 409 N.E.2d 849, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 217 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980); Cf Philipp
Bros. Metal Corp. v. S.S. "Rio lguazu," 658 F.2d 30, (2d Cir. 1981) applying the same rule in
maritime law.
229. 409 N.E.2d at 853, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 222.
230. This results from a reading of U.C.C. § 7-403(1), which provides that the bailee must
deliver to the person entilled under the warehouse receipt unless one of the six specified excuses or
the general "any other lawful excuse" is established by the bailee.
231. Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman Warehouse Co., 458 A.2d 1341, 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 262 (1983).
232. Cited were American Express Field Warehousing Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank, 346 S.W.2d
518 (Ark., 1961); McAllister v. Cord Moving & Storage Co., 301 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. Ct. App.
1957); George v. Bekins Van & Storage, 205 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1949); and Allen v. Line, 34 N.W.2d
835 (S.D. 1948).
233. Inland Metals Ref. Co. v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 266 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
234. Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Upson Nut Co., 101 N.E. 114 (1913).
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nor did the court see any necessary reliance on the false assumption of a
continued possession by the warehouseman.
Judge Pollak, in Adams v. Ryan & Christie Storage, lnc., 235 was obliged to
apply Pennsylvania law in a case where all counsel agreed "that there is no
body of Pennsylvania case law that leads unerringly in one direction or
another." 236 The goods in storage included some carpets of considerable value
which were seen in the vault by plaintiff in 1977, but were gone in 1980. By
stipulation, the parties agreed that nobody within the range of the judicial
process of the court knew what had happened to the carpets. The limitation of
liability clause was on a receipt, "which contained in small but not indecipherable language, a limitation of liability on the part of the warehouse to thirty
cents per pound." 237 Judge Pollak stated that until the J.C.C. Metals case in
New York and its progeny, the prevailing rule under the Code was that an
unexplained disappearance permitted an inference of negligence, but not of
conversion. 238 He concluded that since conversion was a willful tort, which he
felt bordered on criminal conduct, it was not to be inferred from a totally
unexplained disappearance.
Judge Pollak then raised the issue of the effect of the optional language in
U.C.C. section 7-403(1 )(b) following the provision giving the bailee the burden
of establishing as an excuse for nondelivery that there was "damage to or delay,
loss or destruction of the goods for which the bailee is not liable." In seventeen
states, including New York, adopting the optional language or a variation
thereof, 239 the clause is followed by "but the burden of establishing negligence in
such cases is on the person entitled under the document." The added language
has been attacked as wrong in policy. 240 Judge Pollak points out that the New
York Court of Appeals made its decision
in the face of-I think 'in the teeth' is the proper phrase-in the teeth of
exactly such language. In my view that fact only goes to cast some further
doubt on the wisdom of the New York Court of Appeals in reaching the
result it did, but that, of course, leads me to an essentially impertinent
judgment, since whatever my competence may be as a trial judge to try to
figure out what the law of Pennsylvania might be in a case where the
Pennsylvania appellate courts have not spoken, I guess nobody has autho-

235. 563 F. Supp. 409, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 930 (E.D. Pa 1983).
236. Id. at 441, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 932.
237. Id. at 410, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 931.
238. As illustrative, the judge cited Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d
647, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1155 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977). 563 F. Supp. at 411, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 932.
239. The states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming.
240. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 129, at§ 203, 791.
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rized me to set myself up as a critic of the New York Court of Appeals'
construction of its Uniform Commercial Code. 241
Notwithstanding his disclaimer, the good judge could not refrain from citing a
law review note that also expressed some doubts as to the "merit of the decision
from an analytic point of view." 242
The issue between the two views is a narrow one and basically comes down to
one of risk-sharing by contract. The limitation of liability of the warehouseman
is dependent on the offering of protection at a greater value if, in effect, the
bailor pays a premium for it. 243 If the warehouseman is regulated by a filed
tariff, then any value above tariff limitations must be covered by the bailor's
own msurance.
The states enacting the added language in U.C.C. section 7-403(1)(b) took
the position that the discovery procedures available in the litigation process
would enable plaintiffs to uncover evidence of a warehouseman's "conversion to
his own use," and that the failure to deliver in the absence of the establishment
of excuse should establish no more than a permissive influence which the trier of
fact could draw, but should not be compelled to draw. In the absence of the
optional additional language in U.C.C. section 4-403( 1)(b), as adopted by the
state whose law governs, the failure to deliver with no explanation forthcoming
should result in a directed verdict on negligence. It is not clear whether this was
Judge Pollak's result, or whether he drew the permitted inference in his
capacity as a trier of fact, realizing that in the case of any conflict in the evidence
the burden of proof, in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, was on the
plaintiff.
The next issue, then, is really the extent to which such limitations of liability
and right to declare increased value for a fee, must be brought home to bailors
when the contract is made. As to warehousemen, the technique used in the Code
was one of supplying a post-contract grace period for a unilateral modification
after responsible people read the contract.
241. 563 F. Supp. at 414, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 936-37. Judge Pollak referred to Note,
Survey of New York Law of 7980, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 203, 209-10, as also expressing some doubts
about the merit of the decision from an analytic point of view.
Professor Leary has a recollection (subject to the inaccuracies of 30-year-old recollections) that
the optional language, contained in the 1954 Supplement No. 1 approved by the Permanent
Editorial Board, was added in response to a fear that the warehousemen's and carriers' lobbies
could, in many states, defeat the enactment of the Code if the optional language, based on pre-Code
authority, was not available. The optional language reflected federal cases under the federal act and
the common law as well as one side of a pre-Code split of authority.
242. 563 F. Supp. at 414, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. al 937 (citing Note, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 203,
209-10 (1980)).
243. U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (1978) contains the following proviso:
provided, however, that such liability may on written request of the bailor at the time of
signing such storage agreement or within a reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse
receipt be increased on part or on all of the goods thereunder, in which event increased rates
may be charged based on such increased valuation, but that no such increase shall be permitted
contrary to a lawful limitation of liability contained in the warehousemen's tariff, if any.

1908

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 39, August 1984

The same limitation of liability for negligence, but not for "conversion to his
own use," is set forth for carriers in U.C.C. section 7-309, but with significantly
different limitations. The carriers' rates must be based on value, the tariff must
afford an opportunity to declare a different value, or if there is no tariff, the
bailor is "otherwise advised" of the opportunity to obtain a higher value.
The "otherwise advised" issue came before the Louisiana Court of Appeals
in Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Purolator Armored, lnc. 2•• The bank had a
standing contract with Purolator to transport currency from the bank to a Navy
support office and port of embarkation near New Orleans with a clause which
limited Purolator's liability to a maximum of $40,000 per shipment. No tariff
was made available by attachment to the contract or other publication and the
branch manager from Purolator in New Orleans testified that neither he nor
anyone working in his office ever advised the bank of an opportunity to increase
the limits.
In litigation were two shipments aggregating $150,000. The van carrying
them had a newly hired guard riding in the rear who, when the vehicle stopped
at a traffic light, skipped out with the money and was never found. He was
hired without verification of statements in his application as to name, social
security number, and references. This was found to be negligent as the missing
guard had, in fact, a bad record.
Without making any finding as to whether under Louisiana law a carrier
such as Purolator could by contract avoid liability for negligence, 245 the court
affirmed a trial-court judgment for the bank in the amount of $150,000 on the
ground that Purolator had not complied with the necessary preconditions of
U.C.C. section 7-309. Depending on the common sense of the bank to inquire
did not satisfy the Code. The court declined to outline the procedures that
would.
In Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 246 the Connecticut court had
before it a case involving storage receipts before the adoption of the U.C.C. by
Connecticut. Stating that the Code was declaratory of the common law, the
court ruled that the warehouseman had not effectively overcome the presumption of negligence and that at common law a warehouseman, to secure a
limitation of liability, must prove either actual knowledge of the limitation on
the part of the bailor or facts giving rise to a justifiable belief on the part of the
warehouseman that the bailor had such knowledge. There may be a need for
some statement in the Code of the minimum requirements for bringing the
available options for higher value home to those contracting for storage. Perhaps
244. 425 So. 2d 961, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 275 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
245. U.C.C. § 7-309( 1), imposing a reasonable care standard, contains the following sentence
not found in U.C.C. § 7-204: "This subsection does not repeal or change any law or rule of law
which imposes liability upon a common carrier for damages not caused by its negligence."
Apparently, pre-Code Louisiana law provided a rule of strict liability for bailees for hire. See La.
Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2751, 2754 and 2937-2957; Avant v. A-1 Moving & Storage Co., 260 So. 2d
355 (La. Ct. App. 1972), as cited in the instant case.
246. 446 A.2d 799, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 970 (Conn. 1982).
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it was the absence of such protective provisions that motivated the New York
Court of Appeals decision in /.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 247
although a consumer case would have provided a more suitable vehicle. 248

CONFLICTING CLAIMS
Conflicting claims against a warehouseman often produce interesting situations. In Northwestern National Sales, Inc. v. Commercial Cold Storage, lnc. 249
Northwestern had sold a truckload of frozen beef to American International
Meat Importers on credit. The beef was then stored with Commercial. On
hearing that American had ceased paying its creditors, Northwestern, within
ten days, made a U.C.C. section 2-702(2) demand for reclamation with a copy
to Commercial, and filed a garnishment action against American as defendant
and with Commercial as garnishee. Commercial refused to deliver the beef to
Northwestern. American then filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Fourteen days after the delivery to Commercial, the bankruptcy judge directed
all warehousemen to deliver to American free of claims of all third parties.
Commercial complied, whereupon Northwestern sued in co11version, based on
its U.C.C. section 2-702(2) demand and failure to deliver. The Georgia Appeals
Court held that a temporary failure to deliver when there were conflicting
claims, pending a proper resolution thereof, did not constitute a conversion
under U.C.C. section 7-603.
A failure to deliver on demand to a party who, after protracted litigation, was
held to be entitled to delivery was itself held, in Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa
Guznian, S.A., 250 not to constitute a conversion. In view of a certain lack of
coordination between U.C.C. sections 7-403(1) and 7-603, tpe court indicated
that where a prompt filing of an interpleader action followed· conflicting claims,
the threat of vexatious litigation constituted either a "personal defense" under
U.C.C. section 7-403(1)(f), or an "other lawful excuse" under U.C.C. section
7-403(1 )(g). Since U.C.C. section 7-603 specifically excuses delivery when there
is a factual conflict as to entitlement, it would seem that its provisions override
U.C.C. section 7-403, the preamble whereof makes entitlement a prerequisite.
Preferable would be a wording of U.C.C. section 7-403( 1) stating "Except as
provided in Section 7-603." Strictly speaking, the excuses listed are grammatically required to be excuses against a person entitled to delivery, not against one
whose entitlement is clouded but later established.
Finally we note that in Hughes v. Accredited Movers, lnc., 251 the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, joined other courts in requiring strict
compliance with the detailed requirements of U.C.C. section 7-210(2), governing sale in foreclosure of a warehouseman's lien, despite a finding of
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

409 N.E.2d 849, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 217 (1980).
Cf Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947).
293 S.E.2d 30, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
696 F.2d 359, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 589 (5th Cir. 1983).
461A.2d1203, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 938 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
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substantial compliance by the warehouseman and no prejudice to the bailor of
household goods.

